SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917

SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917

SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917

Dette temmelig uskarpe billede viser SMS -en fra slagkrydseren i Moltke -klassen Moltke til søs et stykke tid, før hendes torpedonet blev fjernet i 1917.


Historie

Fra den 11. maj til den 29. juni 1912 blev Moltke foretog en tur til Nordamerika med den lille krydstogt -sms Stettin . De løb fra Kiel via Ponta Delgada til Cape Henry, hvor de mødte stationcruiserens SMS Bremen . Krydserne kom ind på Hampton Roads sammen, hvor de blev modtaget den 3. juni af den amerikanske atlanterhavsflåde i overværelse af USA's præsident William Howard Taft. Den 8./9. Juni flyttede divisionen under kommando af kontreadmiral Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz til New York, hvor Moltke og Stettin begyndte deres march tilbage til Tyskland via Vigo den 13. juni.

Første verdenskrig

Det Moltke oplevede sin første krig missioner den 3. november og 16. december 1914. Her sammen med Seydlitz, det skød de engelske byer Yarmouth og Hartlepool. Den 24. januar 1915 deltog hun i slaget på Doggerbanken. Den 19. august 1915 blev Moltke var torpederet i Østersøen af ​​den britiske ubåd E1 under det andet fremskridt til Riga -bugten. Efter restaurering var hun involveret i bombardementet af Lowestoft og Great Yarmouth den 24. og 25. april 1916.

Den 31. maj 1916 blev den Moltke var det fjerde skib i den 1. rekognosceringsgruppe under viceadmiral Franz von Hipper, der deltog i søslaget på Skagerrak. Efter fejlen i hans flagskib SMS Lützow og efter timer på en torpedobåd skiftede Hipper endelig til Moltke .

Da de baltiske øer blev besat af tyske tropper (Albion Company) i oktober 1917, blev Moltke var flagskib i den store forening dannet til dette formål under kommando af viceadmiral Ehrhard Schmidt. Den 12. oktober 1917 blev den Moltke, i forbindelse med III. Eskadron (fire skibe i König -klassen og SMS Bayern ) fra 5:45 på det russiske batteri nr. 46 (fire 15,2 cm kanoner) på Cape Ninnast (estisk Ninase) på østsiden af ​​Tagga Bay (estiske Tagalaht) nordsiden af ​​øen Ösel for at understøtte hovedlandingen af hærens tropper planlagt til 6 am

Den 17. november 1917 blev Moltke ankom sent på slagmarken under det andet søslag nær Helgoland i forbindelse med det nye slag krydstogt Hindenburg . De skulle støtte de to storlinjeskibe Kaiser og Kaiserin , som havde skyndte sig at hjælpe den lille krydser Königsberg , som blev ramt af en 38 cm skal. Briterne trak sig derefter tilbage.

Den 23. april 1918 blev den Moltke lidt en alvorlig turbineulykke, inden han forsøgte at angribe en britisk konvoj i Nordsøen nær Norge. Hun måtte slæbes tilbage fra Oldenburg til Wilhelmshaven. På vejen tilbage, Moltke var torpederet af den britiske ubåd E42 , men nåede havnen med 2100 t vand i skibet. Det Moltke var i værftet indtil august.


Indhold

Byggeri og idriftsættelse

SMS Moltke var det første skib af Bismarck klasse, der skal nedlægges. Byggeriet begyndte i juli 1875 under kontraktnavnet Ersatz Arcona på Imperial Shipyard i Danzig. Arbejdet med Moltke gik langsommere end på andre skibe i klassen, da statens værfter ikke var så erfarne som de private skibsbygningsvirksomheder som Norddeutsche Schiffbau AG, der byggede Bismarck . Logisk set er Moltke var kun lanceret som det fjerde medlem af klassen, hvorfor klassen blev opkaldt efter det første færdige skib, the Bismarck . Moltke blev døbt den 18. oktober 1877 af admiral Albrecht von Stosch, første chef for det nystiftede kejserlige admiralitet, i overværelse af skibets navnebror, feltmarskal Helmuth von Moltke. Udstyrsarbejdet blev afsluttet i april 1878, og idriftsættelsen fandt sted den 16. april. Fra den 28. til den 29. april blev Moltke overført til Kiel, hvor hendes oprustning og andet sidste udstyr blev installeret. Testkørslerne begyndte den 18. november og blev afsluttet den 21. december.

Brug i Sydamerika

1. april 1881, SMS Moltke blev bestilt med deres første opgave i udlandet i Sydamerika, som begyndte den 17. april. Den 14. juli nåede skibet Valparaíso for at erstatte den tidligere stationære, korvetten Ariadne . Moltke tog derefter til Coquimbo for at beskytte de tyske indbyggere mod uroligheder på grund af den peruanske sejr i saltpeter krig . Hun nåede havnen den 19. juli og blev der indtil midten af ​​september. I de følgende to måneder, Moltke besøgte flere havnebyer i Peru og gik derefter længere mod nord for at besøge flere byer i Mellemamerika. Den 16. februar 1882 vendte Moltke tilbage til Valparaíso og sejlede igen til Coquimbo den 14. marts. Den 17. maj rejste hun derfra til Montevideo, som skyldtes alvorlige storme Magellanstrædet sker, men kun forsinket og nåede dermed sit mål indtil slutningen af ​​juni.

I Montevideo, SMS Moltke tog deltagerne i den videnskabelige ekspedition, som Tyskland bidrog til det første internationale polarår om bord. Ekspeditionen skulle efter planen tilbringe et år på øen South Georgia for at foretage videnskabelige observationer af en række fænomener, herunder forstyrrelser i det geomagnetiske felt. Moltke forlod Montevideo med ekspeditionen om bord den 23. juli. Mere udstyr var om bord på HSDG - damper SS Rio båret. De to skibe ankom til øen den 12. august efter at have havnet i tung hav og isbjerge. Det tog mere end en uge at finde et passende landingssted, og den 21. august gik forskerne i land i det, der er nu Moltke Havn på nordsiden af ​​Royal Bay, opkaldt efter skibet. Den 24. august var de ved hjælp af besætningen færdige med at losse deres udstyr og opsætte deres indkvartering, og den 3. september, Moltke gik til andre opgaver på vej mod Sydamerika. Corvette Marie ankom året efter for at bringe ekspeditionen tilbage.

Moltke sejlede derefter til Port Stanley på Falklandsøerne og vendte tilbage derfra til Sydamerikas vestkyst. Fra 20. oktober besøgte hun flere chilenske havne og Juan Fernández -øerne. I slutningen af ​​januar 1883 vendte hun tilbage til Valparaíso, hvor hun mødte korvetten Leipzig . Fra 28. februar, Moltke sejlede nordpå for at rejse kysterne i Peru og Ecuador. Efter hans hjemkomst til Valparaíso modtog Moltke ordren den 8. juli om at vende tilbage til Tyskland. På sin vej gennem Magellanstrædet foretog hun en undersøgelse af kystvandene. Den 4. august mødte hun sin efterfølger Marie . Efter et stop på Kap Verde -øerne nåede hun til Kiel den 2. oktober og blev nedlagt der 23. oktober.

Ligesom alle seks skibe i hendes klasse blev hun omklassificeret som krydstogtfregat i 1884.

Som uddannelsesskib 1885–1889

SMS Moltke blev genaktiveret den 15. april 1885 som et træningsskib for flådekadetter. Hun tog på en træningstur i Østersøen og begyndte en rundvisning i norske havne den 20. maj, som hun derefter fortsatte på Island med besøg i Berufjörður og Reykjavik. Den 2. juli ankom hun til Lough Swilly, Irland, hvor hun opholdt sig i en måned og derefter tog til Portsmouth, hvor hun den 15. august blev beordret til at vende tilbage til Tyskland for at slutte sig til Imperial Navy træningseskadron. Fra 30. august til 23. september, Moltke deltog i de årlige flådeøvelser og efter endt manøvrer gik de til Kaiserliche Werft Kiel for vedligeholdelse den 25. september.

Den 1. oktober, Moltke meldte sig igen ind i træningseskadronen og gik den 11. oktober på den næste træningstur til Vestindien. I São Vicente, Kap Verde, blev rejsen afbrudt fra 13. til 30. november, da der opstod spændinger mellem Tyskland og Spanien om konkurrerende krav til Carolines i det centrale Stillehav. Efter at konflikten var løst, fortsatte eskadrillen sin rejse, besøgte en række havne i Caribien og vendte derefter tilbage til Wilhelmshaven den 27. marts 1886, hvor eskadrillen blev opløst. I april Moltke gik til Kaiserliche Werft Kiel igen for en revision. I det følgende år blev træningseskadronen omdannet med Moltke og deltog i flådemanøvrer i august og september som II. Division . Den 14. oktober begyndte eskadrillen vintertræningsløb , som førte den igen til Vestindien og sluttede den 30. marts 1887 i Wilhelmshaven.

I 1887 Moltke blev i Kiel for at deltage i en fest for at markere starten på byggeriet på Kaiser Wilhelm -kanalen. Derefter deltog hun igen i de årlige flådemanøvrer og fra 1. oktober i træningskvadronens vintertræning i Middelhavet. I december besøgte kronprins Friedrich Wilhelm skibene i Sanremo. Den 10. april 1888, Moltke vendte tilbage til Wilhelmshaven og otte dage senere tog han til Kiel for endnu en eftersyn. Dette blev efterfulgt af en rejse til russiske og skandinaviske havne i sommeren 1888. De årlige flådemanøvrer fulgte i august og september og den 29. september begyndte vintertræningsrejsen igen i Middelhavet, som fandt sted efter deltagelse i festlighederne for 25 -årsdagen for kong George I's trone. i Grækenland fra den 27. oktober til den 5. november i Piræus og besøg i nogle havne i det osmanniske rige i Lilleasien og Egypten den 16. april 1889 i Wilhelmshaven. Eskadronen blev opløst og Moltke nedlagt 30. april.

1889-1897

I midten af ​​1889 blev skibet bragt til Kaiserliche Werft i Kiel for omfattende renoveringsarbejde. Renoveringen omfattede et nyt kedelsystem, nye hurtige brandkanoner og indkvartering til op til 50 kadetter og 210 kabinedrenge. Desuden blev rigningen reduceret. Den 1. januar 1891 blev hun officielt føjet til listen over skoleskibe og taget i brug igen 7. april Navnet på skibet Field Marshal Moltke, der døde tre uger senere, og Kaiser Wilhelm II var til stede, da skibet var sættes i drift igen. Moltke begyndte endnu en træningstur den 15. juni med besøg i Vestindien, La Guaira og Bahía Blanca. På vejen tilbage lavede hun den 13. juni 1892 i Norfolk og i begyndelsen af ​​august på Isle of Wight til Cowes regatta station. Her var hun eskorteskibet for Wilhelm II. Ombord på hans yacht Hohenzollern, inden hun den 9. august gik videre til Kiel og straks sluttede sig til flådemanøvrene. Den 30. september blev skibet nedlagt efter dets færdiggørelse.

SMS Moltke vendte tilbage til tjenesten den 5. april 1893 og gennemførte uddannelse i Østersøen, der varede indtil 8. juni. I løbet af denne tid led hun en alvorlig ulykke den 24. maj, da dampskibet SS Helene stødte med en af Moltkes joller, der kæntrede, og seks kabine -drenge blev dræbt. Moltke sluttede sig til de årlige flådemanøvrer i august og september som en del af III. Division på. Vintertræningsdriften begyndte den 14. oktober og førte ind i Middelhavet. Den 21. januar 1894 besøgte Moltke Piræus, hvor hun fik besøg af Wilhelm II, hans søster Sophia af Preussen og hendes mand, kronprins Konstantin af Grækenland. Wilhelm arrangerede besøget mod indsigelser fra kansler Leo von Caprivi, der havde afvist et venskabsbesøg, fordi den græske regering havde stoppet betalinger for udenlandske lån, herunder mange fra Tyskland.

En uge senere tog Moltke til Korfu, hvor hun opholdt sig i fire uger, indtil hun modtog ordren om at rejse til Abbazia for at bringe kejserinde Friedrich, der boede i spaen der, til Fiume, hvor hun mødte østrig-ungareren den 29. marts kejser Franz Joseph mødte jeg. Franz Joseph I kom også om bord den 6. april for at rejse til Pola og inspicere den østrig-ungarske flåde. Moltke bragte kejserinde Frederick fra 16. til 18. april efter Venedig, hvor den italienske konge Umberto I mødte. Den 28. april, Moltke begyndte hjemrejsen til Tyskland og ankom til Kiel den 18. juni. Den 14. august vendte hun tilbage til træningseskadronen, som blev 2. eskadrille under flådemanøvrene. Den årlige vintertræning fulgte den 25. september, denne gang til Vestindien, og sluttede den 22. marts 1895.

I sommeren 1895, SMS Moltke foretog individuelle træningsture i Østersøen, som blev afbrudt i juni ved fejringen af ​​åbningen af ​​Kaiser Wilhelm -kanalen. Hun besøgte derefter Edinburgh og vendte tilbage til Tyskland for de årlige flådemanøvrer i august og september. En uge senere begyndte vintertræningsrejsen i Middelhavet. Under sit ophold i Cadiz blev hun beordret til at rejse til Smyrna i det osmanniske rige så hurtigt som muligt, da uroligheder i regionen truede tyskerne i byen. Hun ankom der den 15. november og sluttede sig til Aviso Loreley , stationsskibet der. I januar 1896, Moltke var trukket tilbage for at fortsætte sine uddannelsesopgaver og besøge adskillige havne i Middelhavsområdet, herunder Messina, Haifa, Port Said og Napoli. Hun vendte tilbage til Kiel den 23. marts og gik til værftet for en ny eftersyn.

I 1896 begyndte uddannelsesåret den 12. maj med en træningsrejse i Østersøen, efterfulgt af besøg i Storbritannien og Irland fra den 26. juni. Under denne rejse, Moltke løb på grund i Hebriderne den 17. juli, men kunne frigøre sig uden skader. Hun kom tilbage til Kiel den 2. august. De årlige flådemanøvrer fulgte som en del af III. Division og fra 26. september kører vintertræningen til Vestindien. Under stoppet på Madeira, Moltke var beordrede igen til Det Osmanniske Rige på den syriske kyst for at beskytte tyske interesser i området truet af uro. Hendes søster sender Stosch , Stein og Gneisenau også deltog i denne operation. Missionen sluttede den 10. februar 1897 og Moltke gik fra Alexandria til Wilhelmshaven, som skibet nåede den 17. marts. Dette blev efterfulgt af endnu et besøg på værftet i Kiel fra den 14. april 1897.

1898-1903

Skibet blev først taget i brug igen den 5. april 1898. Træningsture i Østersøen måtte aflyses den 16. juni på grund af et udbrud af mæslinger i skibets besætning. I juli begyndte en rundvisning i norske havne med stop i Larvik, Bergen og Odda, hvor hun den 7. juli mødte Hohenzollern og den lille krydstogter Hela på kejserens årlige nordlandsrejse. Moltke og Hohenzollern gik derefter til Drontheim, før Moltke gik alene til Lerwick på Shetlandsøerne. Hun ankom tilbage til Kiel den 30. juli. I anden halvdel af august tjente hun i V -divisionen ved flådemanøvrer. Den 3. september rejste hun til Vestindien på en vintertræningstur. Mens hun var i området, blev hun sendt til Havana på grund af frygt for uro i Cuba efter den amerikanske sejr over Spanien i den spansk-amerikanske krig. Hendes tilstedeværelse viste sig at være unødvendig, og derfor vendte hun tilbage til Kiel den 10. januar 1899, hvor hun ankom den 23. marts.

Fra den 24. maj 1899, Moltke foretog endnu et krydstogt i Østersøen, efterfulgt af endnu en træningsrejse til Vestindien fra 5. juli Sydamerikanske havne som Rio de Janeiro var også destinationen for denne rejse. Fra den 22. til den 29. december boede hun i Charlotte Amalie på den danske ø Saint Thomas. Fra 10. til 20. januar 1900 var hun det første tyske krigsskib, der besøgte New Orleans. Hun vendte derefter tilbage til Tyskland og nåede Kiel den 25. marts i Kiel. Træningsture i Østersøen fulgte igen fra maj til september med besøg i Stockholm, København og Stavanger. Den 17. september foretog hun endnu en træningstur til Middelhavet. Under deres ophold i Gibraltar fra 9. til 14. oktober organiserede besætningsmedlemmerne en mindehøjtidelighed på byens kirkegård, hvor ofrene for korvettens besætning Danzig fra slaget ved Tres Forcas blev begravet. Den 7. december, Moltke stoppede i Beirut, hvor hendes øverstbefalende deltog i en ceremoni ved Saladins grav i Damaskus. Hun besøgte andre havne i regionen og krydsede Dardanellerne den 24. januar 1901 med tilladelse fra Sultan Abdülhamid II. Hjemrejsen begyndte den 30. januar, og den 24. februar vendte skibet tilbage til Kiel.

Efter den efterfølgende eftersyn, Moltke foretaget en hydrografisk undersøgelse af Adlergrund fra 21. maj, hvor linjens skib Kaiser Friedrich III. Kørte på grund tidligere på året og blev hårdt beskadiget. Undersøgelsen sluttede den 18. juni, og den 1. august begyndte det årlige træningskrydstogt, der begyndte med besøg i København og Færøerne og fortsatte så langt som til Vestindien, hvor en konflikt mellem Venezuela og Colombia truede Tysklands økonomiske interesser i område. Hun forlod området den 19. december og nåede Baltimore den 24. januar. En delegation fra skibet besøgte derefter Washington, DC, hvor de blev modtaget af præsident Theodore Roosevelt. Efter at have besøgt Annapolis, placeringen af ​​US Naval Academy, vendte hun tilbage til Europa, var til stede i Dartmouth ved lægningen af ​​grundstenen til den nye bygning på Royal Naval College og nåede endelig Kiel den 20. marts.

I 1902 og 1903 Moltke foretog træningsture igen i Østersøen og i Middelhavet. I 1904 blev Østersøens træningsture efterfulgt af endnu en tur til Vestindien og USA, som sluttede den 17. marts 1905 i Kiel, hvor den blev lukket ned 31. marts for en eftersyn.

Som ubådsudbud

SMS Moltke forblev ude af drift indtil den 4. april 1907 og lavede derefter træningsture i Østersøen for sidste gang, efterfulgt af en tur til Sydamerika med besøg i Rio de Janeiro og Vestindien. Den 23. marts 1908 vendte hun tilbage til Kiel, hvor hun blev taget ud af drift den 7. april. Hendes plads i træningseskadronen blev indtaget af den store krydser Hertha . Moltke blev slettet fra søregistret den 24. oktober 1910 og tildelt ubådsskolen i Kiel. Hun blev omdannet til en pram og omdøbt Acheron den 28. oktober 1911 for at kunne bruge hendes navn til slaget krydser Moltke , som netop var taget i brug. Acheron tjente i denne egenskab, indtil den blev solgt til ophugning den 7. juli 1920.


Design

Generelle egenskaber

Det Moltke-klasse skibe var 186.6  m (612  ft 2  in) lange samlet, 29.4  m (96  ft 5  in) brede og havde et dybgang på 9.19  m (30  ft 2  in) fuldt lastet. Skibene fortrængte 22.979  t (22.616 lange tons) normalt og 25.400  t (24.999 lange tons) fuldt lastede. [8] Den Moltke-klasse skibe havde 15 vandtætte rum og en dobbelt bund, der løb for 78% af skibenes køl. De blev anset for at håndtere godt, med skånsom bevægelse, selv i tung sø. De var dog langsomme til at svare på roret og var ikke særlig manøvredygtige. Skibene mistede op til 60% fart og krængede 9   grader ved fuldt ror. [lavere-alfa 4] Skibene havde et standardbesætning på 43 officerer og 1010 mand. Mens Moltke fungerede som flagskibet I Scouting Squadron, blev hun bemandet med yderligere 13 officerer og 62 mand. Mens det tjente som det andet kommandoflagskib, bar skibet yderligere 3 officerer og 25 mand til standardkomplementet. [9]

Fremdrift

Moltke og Goeben blev drevet af fire-akslede Parsons-møller i to sæt og 24 kulfyrede Schulz-Thornycroft-kedler, opdelt i fire fyrrum. [1] Kedlerne var sammensat af en damptromle og tre vandtromler hver, [6] og producerede damp ved 16 standardatmosfærer (240  psi). Efter 1916 blev kedlerne suppleret med tjæreolie. [lavere-alfa 5] Parsons-møllerne blev opdelt i par med højt og lavt tryk. [6] Lavtryksmøllerne var det indre par, og blev placeret i det bageste maskinrum. Højtryksmøllerne var på hver side af lavtryksparret og var placeret i de forreste vingeværelser. Turbinerne drev fire propeller, 3,74  m (12,3  ft) i diameter. [8]

Skibenes kraftværker leverede en nominel 51.289 aksel hestekræfter (38.246  kW) og en tophastighed på 25,5 knob (47,2  km/t 29,3  mph). Dog i forsøg Moltke opnået 84.609  shp (63.093  kW) og en topfart på 28.4 knob (52.6  km/t 32.7  mph) Goeben 's kraftværk producerede kun en lidt lavere hestekræfter og topfart. [5] Ved 14 knob (26  km/t 16  mph) havde skibene en rækkevidde på 4.120 sømil (7.630  km 4.740  mi). [6] Den Moltke-klasse skibe var udstyret med 6 turbo generatorer, der leverede 1.200  kW (1.600  hk) effekt ved 225   volt. [6] Skibene var designet til at bære 1.000  tons kul, selvom de i praksis kunne gemme op til 3.100  tons. Brændstofforbrug ved den seks timers tvungne forsøg var 0,667  kilogram pr. Hestekræfter/time ved 75.744  shk (56.482  kW) og .712  kg pr. Hk/time ved 70.300  shp (52.400  kW) henholdsvis for de to skibe. [8]

Bevæbning

Hovedbevæbningen var ti 28  cm (11  in) SK L/50 [lavere-alfa 6] kanoner i fem tvillingtårne. Kanonerne blev placeret i Drh.L C/1908 tårnmonteringer disse beslag tillod en maksimal højde på 13,5   grader. [1] Denne højde var 7,5 og#160 grader mindre end i den foregående Von der Tann, og som en konsekvens var rækkevidden lidt kortere, ved 18.100  m (19.800  yd), end de 18.900  m (20.700  yd) af Von der Tann er våben. I 1916, under en ombygning, blev højden forøget til 16 grader for et øget område på 19.100  m (20.900  yd). [5] Et tårn, Anton, var placeret forrest, to bagud (Dora tårnet superfiring over Emil), og to, Bruno og Cäsar, blev vingetårne ​​monteret en echelon. Kanonerne affyrede panserbrydende og semi-panserbrydende skaller, som begge vejede 302 og#160kg (670  lb). Kanonerne kunne skyde med en hastighed på 3 runder i minuttet og havde en snudehastighed på 895  m/s (2.940  ft/s). I alt 810 af disse skaller blev opbevaret ombord på skibet. [1]

Skibenes sekundære bevæbning bestod af tolv 15  cm (5,9  in) SK L/45 -kanon, monteret i MPL C/06 -beslagene som i Von der Tann. Kanonerne havde i alt 1800 skaller til 150 pr. Pistol. De 15  cm kanoner havde en rækkevidde på 13.500  m (14.800  yd) ved konstruktion, selvom dette senere blev udvidet til 18.800  m (18.373  yd). [1] I første omgang blev der også monteret tolv 8,8   cm (3,5  in) SK L/45 -kanoner for at forsvare skibene mod torpedobåde og destroyere, men disse blev senere fjernet, hvor kanonerne i den bageste overbygning blev erstattet med fire 8,8  cm Flak L/45 kanoner. [5]

Moltke og Goeben var også bevæbnet med fire 50  cm (20  in) torpedorør en for, en agter og to på bredden, med 11 torpedoer gemt. Torpedoer var af G/7 -modellen, som vejede 1.365   kg (3.010  lb) og bar et sprænghoved, der vejede 195  kg (430  lb). Torpedoer havde en maksimal rækkevidde på 9.300  m (10.200  yd) ved 27  knob (50  km/t) og 4.000  m (4.400  yd) når de blev indstillet til 37  knob (69  km) /h). [10]

Rustning

Skibene var udstyret med Krupp cementeret rustning. Beskyttelsesniveauet for Moltke klasse blev øget fra Von der Tann design, til 10  cm (3.9  in) i det forreste hovedbælte, 27  cm (10.6  in) i citadellet og 10  cm (3.9  in) agter. Kasematerne blev beskyttet af 15  cm (5,9  in) lodret og 3,5  cm (1,4  in) på tagene. Det fremadgående tårn var beskyttet af 35  cm (14  in), og det agterste tårn havde 20  cm (7.9  in) rustning. Tårnene havde 23  cm (9.1  in) i ansigtet, 18  cm (7.1  in) på siderne og 9  cm (3.5  in) på tagene. Dækrustningen og skrå rustning var begge 5  cm (2.0  in), ligesom torpedoskottet omkring barbetterne. Torpedoskottet var 3  cm (1.2  in) i andre, mindre kritiske områder. [2] Som med Von der Tann, rustningen var Krupp cementeret og nikkel stål. [8]


Helmuth von Moltke og oprindelsen til den første verdenskrig

Forskning i oprindelsen til Første Verdenskrig, ligesom arbejdet med de mest kontroversielle historiske emner, er i det mindste til en vis grad underlagt diktaterne fra den videnskabelige måde. Således var det, at for ikke så længe siden fokuserede meget på skriften på dette emne på de kulturelle faktorer, der siges at have disponeret for Europas folk til at haste fremad mod skrænten. Rollen af ​​sådanne amorfe ideer som personlig eller national ære, mandlig lyst eller endda begejstring for ofre implicit i den uoverensstemmende musik og rystende ballet i Stravinskys profetiske Frühlingsopfer (Rite of Spring) tiltrak alle deres andel af historisk opmærksomhed, meget til profitten af ​​vores overordnede forståelse af rødderne i denne konflikt. (1) I de senere år er opmærksomheden imidlertid flyttet væk fra sådanne områder, og der er i stedet dukket op , en betydelig genopvågning af interessen for muligheden for, at det var militære og strategiske faktorer, der udløste krigens udbrud i 1914. Eksempler på større videnskabelige værker på dette område florerer. Således har for eksempel David Herrmann og David Stevenson begge vurderet den indflydelse, som konkurrence inden for oprustning havde på store magtforhold. Niall Ferguson har undersøgt de økonomiske og skattemæssige grundlag for national væbnet rivalisering. Jack Snyder og Stig Förster har undersøgt destabiliserende rolle for de militære doktriner, der understregede offensiv kamptaktik og korte krige. John Maurer har undersøgt stedet for afskrækkelse og afskrækkelsessvigt i det internationale system. Og i Holger Afflerbachs undersøgelse af Erich von Falkenhayn har vi set en større revurdering af den rolle, der spillede for at fremme konflikt af en af ​​de centrale militærpersoner i denne periode. (2) Det er denne historiografiske kontekst - dvs. en voksende og levende revitalisering af militærhistorien - som danner baggrund for Annika Mombauers nye monografi om Helmuth von Moltke, den yngre. Det er imod denne rige litteratur, at hendes arbejde med kejserlige Tysklands sidste chef for den store generalstab i fredstid og den første militære leder for den store krig skal lokaliseres og evalueres.

Det skal klart anføres helt fra begyndelsen, at selvom det militærhistoriske område, hvor Dr. den største betydning. Til en vis grad afspejler dette arten af ​​hendes emne. Den yngre Moltke er en skikkelse, der bare råber efter systematisk undersøgelse og omhyggelig revurdering. For på trods af vigtigheden af ​​hans position som det strategiske chef for Europas mest indflydelsesrige militærmagt har hans karriere ikke været genstand for de detaljerede undersøgelser, der er foretaget af hans mere farverige eller berømte samtidige. Faktisk er han generelt blevet marginaliseret af historikere, hvoraf mange alt for let har accepteret det negative portræt af Moltke, der blev malet efter hans død, af dem fra hans medgeneraler, der søgte at finde en syndebuk for Tysklands manglende vinde en hurtig sejr i den første verden Krig. Følgelig skildres Moltke i meget af litteraturen som en umærkelig mand og som en svag og ineffektiv leder, hvis vigtigste bidrag til tysk nationalliv var at undergrave sit lands chancer for militær succes i 1914. Så gennemgribende har denne tendens været, at i i de senere år har kun Arden Bucholz tilbudt nogen ny indsigt i Moltkes præstationer som militærkommandør. Da dette imidlertid blev gjort som led i en bredere undersøgelse af den preussiske generalstab og dens arbejde på tværs af flere årtier, kunne Bucholz's bog - og faktisk ikke - udpege Moltke til særlig undersøgelse. (3) Således kunne i fremstilling af denne nye monografi - en undersøgelse, der udelukkende og udelukkende fokuserer på Moltke og hans rolle - har Dr. Mombauer afhjulpet denne iøjnefaldende mangel i den historiske litteratur.

Men det faktum, at hun har lavet en retsmedicinsk undersøgelse af en forsømt figur, ville ikke i sig selv gøre hendes bog så bemærkelsesværdig, hvis ikke hendes forskning ubarmhjertigt underminerer de fleste af de eksisterende forforståelser, der omgiver hendes hovedemne. Hvis historikere generelt har ignoreret den yngre Moltke tidligere på grund af hans mangel på indflydelse, vil Dr. Mombauers fund sikkert sikre, at han får en hel del mere opmærksomhed i fremtiden. For hun beviser ganske endegyldigt, at Moltke ikke var den ubetydelige figur, som vi generelt har fået til at tro. Tværtimod havde chefen for den store generalstab betydelig indflydelse på kejser Wilhelm II og kunne også stærkt imponere sine synspunkter på flere førende civile politikere i Tysklands såkaldte 'ansvarlige regering', såsom kejserlige kansler Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg og statssekretær ved udenrigsministeriet Gottlieb von Jagow.

Desuden var det ikke en triviel sag, at han havde adgang til sådanne mennesker og var i stand til at udøve sine overtalelsesbeføjelser, fordi Moltke, som dr. Mombauer endegyldigt viser, var en ivrig krigsmand, der var fast besluttet på at sikre, at Tyskland greb til ultima ratio regis ved den tidligste passende lejlighed. Derfor udnyttede han fuldt ud sin nærhed til både kejseren og kansleren gentagne gange for at tilbyde militær information og specialrådgivning, der var rettet mod at overtale dem til, at det tyske rigs politik skulle være at konstruere en europæisk krig hurtigst muligt. Med henblik herpå under hans embedsperiode, og især i årene fra 1912 til 1914, informerede han uophørligt om, at bevæbningsprogrammerne for Tysklands fjender var sådan, at mens riget var i en gunstig position til at bakke op om sin udenrigspolitik ved en udvej til våben på det tidspunkt, efter 1916 kunne dette ikke længere gøres med nogen garanti for succes. Krig, hvis den skulle komme, insisterede han på, måtte komme med det samme, mens den stadig sandsynligvis ville ende med en tysk sejr. Vent for længe - selv så kort som to år - og Tyskland ville være sårbart over for sine fjender og ude af stand til at håndhæve sine krav. Dette var et budskab, som, som Dr. Mombauer demonstrerer, havde en sigende effekt på den tyske udenrigspolitik, især i sommeren 1914.

Og alligevel var det ikke kun det faktum, at han pressede på for krig, der gør Moltke interessant, så meget som det faktum, at han gik ind for en konflikt i strid med sin egen frygt for det sandsynlige resultat af sådanne fjendtligheder. For mens Moltke erklærede behovet for en umiddelbar våbenudvej højt og gentagne gange over for de øverste politikere i den tyske regering, er det ikke desto mindre ganske tydeligt fra Dr. han gav. På trods af alle hans erhverv, at Tyskland snart måtte gå i krig, fordi de 'gunstige' militære omstændigheder, som riget derefter befandt sig i, uundgåeligt ville forsvinde, forventede chefen for den store generalstab ikke desto mindre den kommende krig, selvom den skulle blive lanceret med det samme for at være en lang og besværlig. Faktisk var han smerteligt bevidst om, at konflikt mellem stormagter i en tid med 'folkekrige' ikke kun stillede hære, men hele befolkninger og økonomier mod hinanden, havde potentiale til at føre kombattanterne til økonomisk ødelæggelse og næsten helt sikkert ville være af forlænget varighed. Alligevel delte han aldrig denne viden med Tysklands civile politikere, selvom han var klar over, at de forventede, at en fremtidig europæisk krig ville vare flere måneder end år. Desuden var denne beslutning om at holde sin frygt for sig selv bevidst, for han vidste godt, at Tysklands politiske ledere kun ville acceptere hans logik om krigens ønskværdighed, hvis de ikke var klar over, hvad virkeligheden indebar. Such was the 'criminal irresponsibility' of his actions: he promoted a war that he was far from certain could be won by deliberately creating false expectations of the likely outcome.

As a result of all the evidence that she has uncovered - and it must be acknowledged that the archival base of this study is very impressive - it is none too surprising that Dr Mombauer concludes that the younger Moltke played a significant part in causing the First World War. It was, after all, his misleading expert advice and constant badgering that created the strong belief among German leaders that war was a viable option that they had to seize in the here and now or forego forever. As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war . on the answer that Moltke gave him.. He did say yes! We would succeed.' This is not to absolve the Reich's political leadership from their share of responsibility for the war. As Dr Mombauer acknowledges, many of them were inherently receptive to Moltke's message and took little convincing that war should not be shirked in 1914. Yet, whether they would have taken this view if Moltke had shared with them his expectations of the nature of the coming war is another matter. By never making his fears known to them, he ensured that German foreign policy never had to be formulated in the cold light of day.

Where does this leave the historiography on the origins of the First World War? Dr Mombauer's book offers copious new grounds for believing that the war was started principally by actions taken in Berlin, many of them by a man whose role has previously been rather downplayed. In this light, the marginalization of Moltke is, clearly, no longer tenable. Rather, it must be acknowledged that Moltke was a major figure in Germany's decision-making elite, whose influence, unfortunately, was far reaching. In particular, he did everything that he conceivably could to make war likely and, in the end, sadly for Germany and Europe, succeeded. On this point, the evidence that Dr Mombauer has collected is unambiguous and utterly compelling.

Her material also suggests a number of refinements need to be made to some existing theories about the background to the war. Niall Ferguson's recent suggestion, for example, that there was too little militarism in Germany before 1914 and that larger German army increases would have made the Reich leadership feel more secure and less inclined to war does not seem likely given Dr Mombauer's profile of Moltke's Weltanschauung. As she says (p. 180), it is more plausible that 'increased spending would only have made them more confident and bellicose, and hence precipitated war even sooner.' In a different vein, her research (esp. pp. 100-5) suggests that it might be worth looking again at Adolf Gasser's ideas on the scrapping of the eastern deployment plan (Grosse Ostaufmarsch), as her material offers some confirmation of his notion that this action shows that a decision against prolonged peace had been taken in 1912/13.

This is not the only area in which the book makes some interesting contributions to existing debates. Despite the fact that the title suggests that the scope of the work is confined to the origins of the war, the study actually continues into the early war years. Thus, in addition to assessing Moltke's contribution to the military outcome to the July Crisis, Dr Mombauer also evaluates his part in the failure of the so-called Schlieffen plan. This is, of course, an old controversy, but Dr Mombauer is, nevertheless, able to bring a genuinely fresh eye to it. Starting from the premise that there was a Schlieffen plan, Terrance Zuber's recent claims notwithstanding (4) that it was Moltke's job to update this plan on a regular basis, that his revisions made sense in the light of the changing circumstances of the European military scene, and that Moltke's actions reflected the fact that he was not a victim of the 'short war illusion', she is able to provide a more balanced perspective to the German reverse at the Marne. This result, which played a major part in ensuring that the First World War would be a prolonged 'total war', was in many respects the culmination of all of Moltke's fears. Once again, however, this fact merely serves to place his actions in pushing so strenuously for war into the sharpest relief.

In conclusion, this study makes a very significant contribution to the scholarship on both Wilhelmine Germany and the military pre-history of the Great War. In the current state of research, it is clearly the definitive statement on the role and career of the younger Moltke as Chief of the Great General Staff. I suspect that it will remain as such for a long time to come.


History of SMS Karlsruhe

SMS Karlsruhe and her three sister ships &ndash SMS Emden, Königsberg og Nürnberg &ndash were vast improvements on their predecessors. Coal was carried in longitudinal side-bunkers, which added extra protection against attack to the internal areas of ship. Oil was stored in tanks within the double-bottom of the ships.

Karlsruhe was commissioned into the High Seas Fleet in November 1916. She served in the II Scouting Group alongside SMS Königsberg og Nürnberg. The ships patrolled the Heligoland Bight in the North Sea, protecting minesweepers against British light forces.

Between September and October 1917 SMS Karlsruhe was involved in Operation Albion, planned to eliminate the Russian naval forces holding the Gulf of Riga in the Baltic Sea.

During the operation SMS Karlsruhe was one of five cruisers of the II Scouting Group commanded by Kontreadmiral (Rear Admiral) von Reuter, who would later give the order to scuttle the German Fleet in Scapa Flow.

She led the transport of German troops during the operation, including a bicycle brigade. For the remainder of Operation Albion the cruiser acted as a scout and protector for the IV Battle Squadron as its battleships destroyed the Russian shore batteries.

SMS Karlsruhe undertook a sortie to protect the light cruisers SMS Bremse og Arcona in April 1918 when they laid offensive mines off the Norwegian coast in advance of an operation to intercept Allied convoys. Det her
operation was called off when the battlecruiser Moltke lost a propeller.

She guarded the coast of Flanders in October 1918 as the Germans evacuated the U-boat and destroyer bases at Zeebrugge and Bruges.

The ship was the only one of the class the Germans managed to scuttle in Scapa Flow as SMS Nürnberg og Emden were both beached by the British.

The wreck was sold in 1962 and partially broken up underwater between 1963 and 1965.

  • Nationality: German
  • Launched: 31 January 1916
  • Commissioned: 15 November 1916
  • Builder: Kaiserliche Werft, Kiel (Imperial Dockyard, Kiel)
  • Construction No: 41
  • Type: Light Cruiser
  • Subtype/class: Königsberg Class
  • Displacement (Standard): 5,440 tonnes
  • Displacement (Full Load): 7,125 tonnes
  • Length Overall: 112m *
  • Beam: 12m
  • Draught: 6.32-5.96m
  • Complement: 475
  • Material: Steel
  • Cause Lost: Scuttled
  • Date lost: 21st June 1919. 1550 hrs
  • Casualties: 0
  • Propulsion: Ten coal-fired and two oil-fired double-ended marine-type boilers. Two sets marine-type turbines (high-pressure turbines worked by geared transmission). Two propellers
  • Fuel: 1,340 tonnes coal, 500 tonnes oil
  • Power: 55,700 shp** maximum
  • Speed: 27.7 knots maximum
  • Armour: ranges from 20-60mm (position dependent), control tower 100mm (on the sides)
  • Armament: 8 x 15cm guns, 2 x 8.8cm guns, 2 x 50cm deck-mounted torpedo tubes, 2 x 50cm lateral submerged torpedo tubes, 200 deck-mounted mines

* Measurements taken from ship's plans
**shp - shaft horsepower

NB: Horsepower is generally given in maximum and design. The former indicates the maximum output of the individual ship under trial conditions and the latter the design output (generally common to all ships of the class).


SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917 - History

The world has suffered from a lot of wars. We lost a considerable number of humans and learned different things from wars. Although war seems like destruction and conflict, yet we learn a lot of stuff from a war. There are two significant wars till now including world war one and world war two. We also had some other battles which were between different countries and territories. World war one was isolated between 1914 and 1918. This was the biggest war of that time. All previous wars were not to its level. Several types of advanced weapons and vehicles were used in this war. This war was started with only some misunderstandings and technological advancements. But ended up to be the most dangerous war of all time. According to studies and history, more than 16 million people died during the world war one. It was really a great loss. The reason behind such loss was the big number of countries involved in this war. Italy, United States, Russia, and France were the counties who fought together. These countries were against the central powers. Central powers include Bulgaria, Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman empire.

In such a huge war, some great weapons and machines were in use. Those were considered the best at that time. It also included battleships which played a vital role in the world war one. There were hundreds of warships which were used to fight against the enemies. All of these battleships were brilliantly loaded with heavy machinery. There were also latest weapons, and armor. If you are a real fan of war machinery, you are at the right place. Today, we will discuss some of the great battleships of world war one.

FS Bouvet

FS Bouvet was one of the best battleships used in the world war one. It was used by the French navy a few years ago before the world war one started. It was used for different assignments, shipments, and other navy tasks. There were two versions of FS Bouvet battleship. The birth date of FS Bouvet is 1898. Just after some time of its release, the French navy though of changing some features. After that, there were a lot of adjustments made in it. They added better weapons capabilities, tank capacities, and ally’s safety. All of these things increased the capabilities of the ship.

The average speed of FS Bouvet was 18 knots. It was good enough as compared to other similar battleships. It had a crew capacity of 710 and considerable ability to take tanks and other war machinery. It was the best ship among others. Later on, it was used in world war one by the French navy, and they got the best from this ship.

HMS utrættelig

HMS utrættelig

Let’s talk about HMS Indefatigable battleship which was used by Britain navy. It was built in 1911. Its design was one of the best models at that time. The early 1900s battleship designs influenced HMS Indefatigable. They were specially created for ultimate war experiences. It was operated by Britain navy and used for several purposes after its launch. HMS Indefatigable was added in the list of all available battleships.

With 4x shafts, massive weapon integration and a large crew, HMS Indefatigable was a non-defeat able ship. There were a lot of guns mounted on the different decks of the ship. There were missile launchers and well placed midships too. This was an amazing ship as it defeated several other ships without any issue. Its average speed was 25 knots. The crew capacity was 800. Its good range also made it one of the best battleships that Britain navy had.

Benedetto Brin

Benedetto Brin

Benedetto Brin was an Italian battleship which was widely used in world war 1. It was launched in 1901. It was based on the Regina Margherita class. That class was specially built for open water conflicts. This battleship had amazing capabilities. From ship capacities to weapons integration, Benedetto Brin was perfect. It also had all procedures for crew safety. Its total length was 139 meters. It had the capability to achieve the maximum speed of 20 knots.

The main feature of this battleship was 12-inch guns which made this ship non defeat-able. These 12-inch guns were designed for extreme conflicts and situations. The crew handled the boat with these guns. Furthermore, the other weapons capacity was good enough to make this ship on the go. Protection was considered a top priority while making it. So, it had enough armory to protect the crew on the board. Unfortunately, it lost a main part in the explosion which was caused on the board by sabotage.

HMS Bellerophon

HMS Bellerophon

HMS Bellerophon was the lead class battleship of the Royal Navy UK. In this battleship, all of the advanced technologies were used to beat the German. This battleship also defeated other ships in the open water war. It was ready to use on 1907 by the Royal Navy. It had the crew capacity of around 735. The length of HMS Bellerophon was 527 feet. It was one of the fastest battleships of the Royal Navy. It was specially designed for naval warfare to defeat other ships.

As compared to other ships, it had more deck space, more weapon integration. It also had advanced ways to get the fastest possible speed while in the conflict. No other battleship had the capability to stop the guns of HMS Bellerophon. A number of heavy guns were there on the deck which were used to take the opponent down within seconds. This ship destroyed a major part of the German fleet. It means HMS Bellerophon played an important role in the world war 1. It was all due to its amazing power and outstanding features.

FS Bretagne

FS Bretagne was a battleship used by the French navy. It was launched on 21 April 1913. It was one of the three ships which were launched for navy purposes. All of the three ships were in use for several wars especially in world war one. It had the length of 166 meters and the crew capacity of 1133. It was one of the best battleships at the French navy dock. The best thing about FS Bretagne was its gun capacity and integration. Several big guns were there on its front deck which had to defend it from the enemy attack.

Another great thing about FS Bretagne battleship was its crew security. It was designed to remain for long times even in the open water warfare. FS Bretagne was sunk by British Royal Navy which also took the lives of more than 1000 sailors on it. At its time, the French navy took the latest weapons and equipment to construct it. This was a great fighting ship along with the other two ships which were also utilized with it. Unfortunately, it couldn’t last for very long and destroyed by British royal navy in the war.

Giulio Cesare

Giulio Cesare was an Italian battleship which was launched in 1911. Giulio Cesare was a first-class battleship which served both world wars. It had the length of 186 meters, and the beam was 28 meters. It was a mighty battleship. Its design was able to work in tough conditions. Several navy technologies were also included such as guns, shields, and missiles.

The best thing about Giulio Cesare battleship was its power. Its power was 31000 horsepower. It tells us how powerful its engines were. Such incredible engines gave it the capability of working with the fastest speed. The crew capacity of this battleship was 1000. In world war one, Giulio Cesare played a vital role. It also served the second world war. yet the activities were considerably less in the second world war. Later on, this battleship was passed to the Soviets. However, we can say that Giulio Cesare battleship served the Italian royal navy for a long time.

IJN Fuso

IJN Fuso was a dreadnought battleship which served the Japanese navy in both world wars. Two warships were made of the same type to serve the world war 1 and other fights. The IJN Fuso was 205-meter-long. IT had the capacity of carrying 1198 crew. The surface speed of IJN Fuso was 23 knots. It was a considerable speed for a dreadnought battleship. When the British navy suggested the name dreadnought, IJN Fuso was made on the same theme. It was called a dreadnought ship which had ultimate capabilities.

The best thing about this ship was its armor and speed. Its speed was 23 knots. The armor of IJN Fuso was good enough. It was able to protect hundreds of crew people who served in the battle. Another interesting thing about IJN Fuso was its battle class. It was included in several classes like fast battleships class and Pre-dreadnought class. This battleship was also used for world war 2. In world war two, IJN Fuso met its fate during the battle of Surigao Strait.

SMS Slesvig-Holsten

SMS Schleswig-Holstein was a pre-dreadnought class battleship originated in the German navy. It was launched in 1905. It was one of the most powerful battleships built by imperial Germany. It had some fantastic specifications like outstanding armor capabilities and good speed. Different types of amours were integrated into this ship to give it a maximum of protection in war. However, unfortunately, it was sunk in 1944.

It was also one of the battleships which fought world war one and survived. It also served the navy in world war two until it sunk in 1944. Its powerful coal-fed steam engines were capable of giving it the speed of 17 knots. It was a whole new class of fighting surface battleships. The SMS Schleswig-Holstein battleship participated in different small and big wars. Every time, it defended the holders and did a great job. Later on, several warships were created on the basis of SMS Schleswig-Holstein.

HMS King Edward VII

HMS King Edward VII was the lead battleship of the class pre-dreadnought battleships. It was the best battleship in its class. That’s the reason why its name was Kind Edward. It was ready to use in 1903 with the length of 138-meter, the draft of 8.15 meters and beam of 24 meters. The crew capacity of HMS King Edward VII was 775. Its top speed was 18.5 knots.

Besides all of its specifications, it was great for the open water wars. It served several conflicts and wars. Every time, it performed well. It was used for protecting the crew, fighting with the opponents and managing the in-war tasks. In the pre-dreadnought class of British royal navy, there were several battleships. However, HMS King Edward VII was the best one. Another great cause of its popularity was its all big gin title. The integrated guns were so good. This battleship could easily beat any of the other battleship.

SMS Moltke

SMS Moltke was the lead battleship of Moltke class battlecruisers. It was ready to use in 1908. It served for imperial German navy in the world war one. The crew capacity of this battleship was 1053. The top speed of SMS Moltke battlecruiser was 28 knots which was the best speed at that time. Most of the battleships had an average speed of 20 to 25 knots. However, the SMS Moltke had 28 knots of speed. This speed made it the lead battleship of Moltke class battlecruisers.

Two ships were there to fight against the British dreadnoughts. SMS Moltke was one of those ships. It fought against the British ships as well as served other wars and conflicts. It was one of the only battleships which served a lot of battles and survived. The great armor and weapon integrations played a functional role to win battleship.

Tags: world war 1 battleships, german world war 1 battleships, world war 1 battleships facts, british battleships of world war 1, world war 1 american battleships


Indhold

During a May 1907 conference, the Germany Navy Office decided to follow up the Von der Tann unique battlecruiser with an enlarged design. [ 3 ] The 44 million marks allocated for the 1908 fiscal year created the possibility of increasing the size of the main guns from the 28 cm (11 in) weapons of the preceding design to 30.5 cm (12 in). However, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, along with the Construction Department, argued that increasing the number of guns from 8 to 10 would be preferable, as the 28 cm guns had been deemed sufficient to engage even battleships. Tirpitz also argued that, given the numerical superiority of the Royal Navy's reconnaissance forces, it would be more prudent to increase the number of main guns, rather than increase their caliber. [ 3 ] The General Navy Department held that for the new design to fight in the battle line, 30.5 cm guns were necessary. Ultimately, Tirpitz and the Construction Department won the debate, and Moltke was to be equipped with ten 28 cm guns. It was also mandated by the Construction Department that the new ships have armor protection equal or superior to Von der Tann ' s and a top speed of at least 24.5 knots (45.4 km/h). [3]

During the design process, there were many weight increases due to growth in the size of the citadel, armor thickness, additions to the ammunition stores, and the rearrangement of the boiler system. It was originally planned to build only one ship of the new design, but due to the strains being put on the Navy design staff, it was decided to build two ships of the new type. [ 3 ] They were assigned under the contract names of "Cruiser G" and "Cruiser H". As Blohm & Voss made the lowest bid for "Cruiser G", the company also secured the contract for "Cruiser H". The former was assigned to the 1908–09 building year, while the latter was assigned to 1909–10. [ 4 ]

The contract for "Cruiser G" was awarded on 17 September 1908, under building number 200. The keel was laid on 7 December 1908, and the ship was launched on 7 April 1910. "Cruiser G" was commissioned on 30 September 1911 as SMS Moltke. [ 1 ] The ship's namesake was Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army in the mid 19th century. [ 5 ] "Cruiser H" was ordered on 8 April 1909 with the building number 201. The ship's keel was laid on 12 August 1909 the hull was launched on 28 March 1911. After fitting-out, "Cruiser H" was commissioned on 2 July 1912 as SMS Goeben. [ 1 ] The ship was named for August Karl von Goeben, a Prussian general who served during the Franco-Prussian War. [6]


SMS Helgoland

In the run-up to World War 1 (1914-1918), Germany and Britain squared off in an arms race to gain superiority where possible. A prime portion of the acquisitions for both sides were in warships of which many types were taken into service and intended to offer the slightest of advantages needed in a future naval fight. One product of the period for the Imperial German Navy became the Helgoland-class, a group of four-strong surface combatants (formally classified as "Dreadnought" battleships) built from 1908 to 1912 and in commissioned service from 1911 to 1920. All four would take part in The Great War and, rather amazingly, all four would survive to see its end in 1918. The ships of the class were SMS Helgoland herself and sisters SMS Ostfriesland, SMS Thuringen, and SMS Oldenburg.

SMS Helgoland was built by the specialists of Howaldtswerke Werft of Kiel and named after the small archipelago of the North Sea - "Heligoland" off the northwest coast of Germany. The vessel saw its keel laid down on November 11th, 1908 with launching had on September 25th of the following year. Commissioned into service on August 23rd, 1911, the warship was ready for action by the time of World War 1 - which began August of 1914.

At the time of their commissioning, the Helgoland-class were the first of the Imperial German Navy to take on the 12" (30.4cm / 304mm) naval gun as main armament and the last "three-funneled" warship group taken into service. The type succeeded the Nassau-class group built from 1907 to 1910 and in commission from 1909 to 1919. Four of this Dreadnought battleship group were completed as well. Taken as a whole, the Helgoland-class was a slight improvement over the preceding Nassau warships - which operated with 11" guns at the main battery.

The complete armament suite involved 12 x 30.5cm main guns, 14 x 15cm secondary guns, and 14 x 8.8cm tertiary guns. 6 x 50cm torpedo tubes were also fitted. Of note regarding the main gun battery was hexagonal placement of the six turrets surrounding the hull superstructure. Two turrets were set to each side of the ship with another seated fore and the remainder aft. Each showcased a twin-gunned arrangement and gave the ship considerable flexibility for engaging targets at any angle.

Power was from 15 x Boiler units feeding 4-cylinder vertical triple-expansion steam engines developing 27,617 horsepower driving 3 x Shafts astern. Maximum speed in ideal conditions would reach nearly 21 knots (20.8 kts) and range while treading water at 10 knots was 5,500 nautical miles (6,330 miles).

Aboard was a crew of 42 officers with 1,027 sailors/enlisted personnel. Armor protection reached 12" at the belt, another 12" at the primary turrets, and 2.5" at the deck. Well armed and armored, Helgoland presented itself as a major foe on the high seas.

SMS Helgoland formed part of the vaunted "High Seas Fleet" of Germany which competed directly against the might of the British "Grand Fleet". Helgoland began service by patrolling across the North Sea and countered the Russian threat in the Baltic Sea for a time. She supported actions at the Battle of the Gulf of Riga during August of 1915 - an Allied victory - which took place from August 8th until August 20th.

The major contest involving Helgoland became the famous Battle of Jutland - the grand engagement of both German and British fleets in what became an indecisive battle claimed as a victory for both sides. The battle took place on May31st through June 1st, 1916 with the British losing more ships to the enemy though the German fleet was now more-or-less contained for the remainder of the war. Helgoland took damage in the action but lived to fight another day.

As with other ships of the German fleet, SMS Helgoland was intended for the final suicidal push against the British Navy to gain better surrender conditions for Germany by 1918. However this assault never took place due to mutiny and sabotage within the ranks - and the end of the war, by way of the Armistice, followed in November of 1918, bringing about an end to the Imperial German Navy threat in the region.

Helgoland joined her three sisters in being stripped of their war-making capabilities and were handed over to the British as prizes. She was removed from active service on December 16th, 1918 and her name was struck from the Naval Register on November 5th, 1919. The British took formal ownership of the vessel on August 5th, 1920 and the hull was scrapped in 1921 - she was gone in full by 1924.


Moltke-class battlecruiser

The Moltke class was a class of two battlecruisers of the German Imperial Navy built between 1909–1911. Named SMS Moltke and SMS Goeben, they were similar to the previous battlecruiser Von der Tann, but the newer design featured several incremental improvements. The Moltkes were slightly larger, faster, and better armored, and had an additional pair of 28 cm guns. Both ships served during World War I. The ships were scuttled on 21 June 1919 to prevent their seizure by the Allies. Goeben was retained by the new Turkish government after the war. She remained on active service with the Turkish Navy until being decommissioned on 20 December 1950. The ship

About Moltke-class battlecruiser in brief

The Moltke class was a class of two battlecruisers of the German Imperial Navy built between 1909–1911. Named SMS Moltke and SMS Goeben, they were similar to the previous battlecruiser Von der Tann, but the newer design featured several incremental improvements. The Moltkes were slightly larger, faster, and better armored, and had an additional pair of 28 cm guns. Both ships served during World War I. The ships were scuttled on 21 June 1919 to prevent their seizure by the Allies. Goeben was retained by the new Turkish government after the war. She remained on active service with the Turkish Navy until being decommissioned on 20 December 1950. The ship was sold to M. K. E. Seyman in 1971 for scrapping. She was towed to the breakers on 7 June 1973, and the work was completed in February 1976. In 1952, when Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the ship was assigned the hull number B70. It was unsuccessfully offered for sale to the West German government in 1963. The former was assigned to the 1908–09 building year, while the latter was assigned for 1909–10 building year. The keel was laid on 7 December 1908, and launched on 7 April 1910 as SMS Moltk. The Ship’s namesake was Field Marshal Helmuth von moltke, the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army in the mid-19th century. After fitting out, the hull was launched on 28 March 1911, and she was commissioned on 28-out-out of 1911.

She served with the Ottoman Empire as a member of the Central Powers until being stricken from the Navy register on 14 November 1954. She is now a museum ship in Istanbul, Turkey, with the name “Moltk” or “Geben” in honor of the former Chief of the Army’s Field Staff, Field Marshal von Moltkel, who was killed in action during the Second World War. She also served as a training ship with the German Navy. She has been preserved at the Museum of Naval History and Science in Düsseldorf, Germany, where she is on display as part of a permanent collection of naval memorabilia. She had a top speed of 24.5 knots and a top armor protection equal or superior to Von derTann’s and a armor thickness of 1.5 meters. The vessel was scrapped in February 1973, after being sold to a German company. She remains in the museum’s collection today, but has been dismembered and is being used to house a museum museum in the city of Duesseldorfer, Germany. The hull number of the ship is B70, and it is currently being used as a museum vessel by the German Museum of Military History and Culture. The name of the Ship’s hull is “Gibraltar”, after the Battle of the Gulf of Riga, which took place in the Baltic Sea in 1914.


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