Hvorfor blev det amerikanske bordtennishold sendt til det kommunistiske Kina, selv efter en forskel i ideologi?

Hvorfor blev det amerikanske bordtennishold sendt til det kommunistiske Kina, selv efter en forskel i ideologi?


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USA havde en embargo på plads med Kina på grund af at have kæmpet mod kineserne i Korea under Korea -krigen. I 20 år satte ingen amerikaner fod i Kina. Endelig blev det amerikanske bordtennishold imidlertid sendt til Kina. Hvordan var dette muligt? Var dette et privat initiativ eller en del af USA's udenrigspolitik.


I 1971 eller deromkring besluttede præsident Richard Nixon en politik for "normalisering" af forholdet til Kina. Ankomsten af ​​det amerikanske pingponghold var den første "føler" i denne proces.

Dette blev fulgt i 1972 af præsident Nixons historiske besøg i Kina, der sluttede den "kolde krig" mellem USA og Kina.


Sandt eller forkert: Kina er egnet til at spille vært

Da jeg for fire år siden kørte ind i Beijing for første gang, ramte poppeltræerne langs lufthavnens motorvej mig som en falsk og forgæves gestus. Dette var, hvad der nu er den gamle lufthavn, der kommer fra den nuværende internationale terminal. I det øjeblik var det hele nyt for mig, og det virkede kun rimeligt at gøre nogle antagelser om, hvad der passerede uden for taxavinduet. Træerne, jeg kunne se, var uklare-slanke grågrønne ting, plantet i lineal-lige rækker, halvt forsvindende, da de trak sig tilbage i den brunlige smog.

Så her var det nye Kina: en kvist af babyens ånde faldt ned i en røgstak.

Jeg har foretaget et par dusin ture langs motorvejen siden som en tilbagevendende gæst og til sidst,

i de sidste par år som beboer i Beijing. Jeg siger "beboer" i den forstand, at min kone og jeg bor her, lejer en lejlighed og har købt en sofa, og at vores søn blev født i byen - dog lovligt, som udenlandsk journalist uden et certificeret permanent bureau, er jeg afhængig af en række midlertidige visa. Fire år er lang tid i Beijing, en by genopfinder og genopbygger sig selv. Poplerne har fyldt sig ud i en grøn væg, der ikke virker mere eller mindre uærlig end de skovstrimler, jeg voksede op med i Amerika, og skjulte underinddelinger og mellemstatslige for hinanden.

Luften er også blevet renere - ikke ren, ikke engang tæt på, hvad de fleste amerikanere ville kalde ren, men ikke den ubrudte, kvælende fug fra 2004. Biltrafik er tykkere hele tiden, og støv er endemisk, men den gradvise flytning af tunge industrien væk fra bymidten har gjort tingene mindre kvælende. Hvor meget mindre kvalt er et igangværende mysterium, en kritisk læsning af officiel statistik tyder kraftigt på, at myndighederne har rodet med luftkvalitetsnumrene for at imødekomme den stadigt voksende årlige kvote af "blå himmel" -dage, der er lovet Den Internationale Olympiske Komité. Alligevel er himlen blåere og blå oftere, end de var for et par år siden. Regeringen har opgivet fiktionen om at kalde mørket "tåge" i stedet for "dis", og der kan gå uger mellem de værste afsnit af det. Nogle gange om natten er der stjerner.

Endnu bedre regner det: I en by, der er tørret af år med tørke, forværret af regntæmmende forurening, var juni lige forbi den vådeste i 15 år. Det er rigtigt, at det kommunale vejrmodifikationskontor har sprængt skyerne med sølv-iodid-artilleri for at hjælpe regnen med, men den frodige plantevækst er alligevel trøstende.

Vil forholdene være sunde nok for atleterne? Nu er vi ved at komme til den svære del. Tæt på synes svaret at være, at luften nok ikke skulle være for dårlig - hvis trafikrestriktionerne lykkes med at holde halvdelen af ​​de tre millioner private biler væk fra gaderne, hvis fabrikker bremser produktionen, hvis byggeriet graver stopper efter planen , hvis vinden blæser fra nord i stedet for den industrielle syd og sydøst.

Men det er kun en lille del af det underliggende, animerende spørgsmål (eller problem): er Kina egnet til at være vært for sommer -OL? For nogle dele af Vesten kan det besvares med en simpel syllogisme: OL er gode. Kina er dårligt. Kina bør ikke være vært for OL.

Ligesom en rulletaske, der kan udvides, kan denne konklusion pakkes ud for at indeholde enhver ideologi, du gerne vil have med i den: antikommunisme, demokrati, tibetansk uafhængighed, pressefrihed, miljøisme, arbejderrettigheder, internetåbenhed, Darfur. Kina kan være et foruroligende og provokerende sted at bo-en stat, der er så reguleret, at uniformeret politi har banket på døren og er kommet ind for at tjekke min families papirer, et virksomhedssystem, der er så ukontrolleret, at et hospital krævede penge på forhånd inden et akut C-afsnit. Udenfor undertrykkes undertrykkelse af censorer, og intern uenighed undertrykkes af fængsler.

Og alligevel er der en række komplikationer i den samtidige brief mod Kina: spændingen mellem centralregeringen og despotiske lokale embedsmænd, den foreløbige udvidelse af ejendomsrettigheder, nyligt hjertelige forhold til Taiwan, en øget vægt fra ledelsen på at dæmpe miljøskader. Tyrannierne og indtrængningerne sameksisterer i en stadigt skiftende balance med fremskridt, mulighed og håb. Hvor rent er rent nok? Hvor åbent er åbent nok? Hvor gratis er gratis nok?

Kina gør det ikke altid let at tale om nuancer. For alle sine løfter om samarbejde og adgang til den udenlandske presse sidder bureaukratiet stort set fast i sine vaner med mistanke og usamarbejde over for udenlandske journalister - og fjendtlighed over for ikke -godkendte kinesiske. Jo tættere legene kommer, jo mere viser det offentlige sikkerhedsapparat, at det ikke går på kompromis med at opretholde streng kontrol: indførelse af nye kontrolpunkter, tilføjelse af byrdefulde visumkrav, aflysning af arrangementer og forestillinger, som det vil.

Inden vi sætter Kina for retten, bør vi dog stille et spørgsmål om den anden del af argumentet: hvor gode er OL, igen, præcis? I optakten til legene har Kinas kritikere gentagne gange sammenlignet Beijing i 2008 med Berlin i 1936. Og hvem vil være pro-nazistisk? Spørgerne var glade for at bemærke, da fakkelrelæet mod Beijing blev forstyrret af protester i foråret, at flammens drift var et ritual opfundet til Hitlers spil. Men det samme er monumental olympisk byfornyelse og hele den heroiske olympiske kinematografis ordforråd. At antyde, at Beijing Games unikt ligner Berlin, betyder bevidst at ignorere årtiers historie. De olympiske idealister har en tendens til at forvirre den olympiske våbenhvile - den midlertidige afsættelse af internationale fjendtligheder - med den gamle historiens afslutning, det fredelige rige opnået efter verdens gradvise udvikling mod et anstændigt liberalt demokrati. Lad os her fastslå, at de olympiske lege rører og opløfter, at de i bedste fald opnår den vanskelige bedrift at give afsæt for national stolthed, samtidig med at de fremmer international harmoni. De olympiske lege er også rekordhensyn et fascistisk skuespil, som bæres af global korporatisme. I mere end to årtier, ind i det 21. århundrede, havde I.O.C. blev ledet af den tidligere sportssekretær i Franco -diktaturet. Det samme regelsæt, der forhindrer deltagerne i at vifte med det tibetanske flag i sommer, vil også blokere alle for at folde et uautoriseret Nike -reklamebanner ud.

Meget af argumentet om Beijing omhandler spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt politik har en plads ved OL eller ej. Menneskerettighedsdemonstranterne-eller, hvis du foretrækker, splittisterne i Dalai-kliken-foreslår, at Beijing-legene kan være en platform for kritik af Kina, i stil med de berømte Black Power-hilsner ved legene i 1968. Men på medaljestanden i Mexico City protesterede John Carlos og Tommie Smith stort set deres eget lands uretfærdigheder, ikke deres værts. Dette punkt bliver mere relevant i lyset af det faktum, at de mexicanske myndigheder 10 dage før disse OL sendte kampvogne og tropper ind på en offentlig plads for at afskaffe pro-demokratiske protester og slagte hundredvis af demonstranter. Med fred sikret fortsatte legene.

Hvilke olympiske standarder mangler Kina? Legens historie er til dels en historie med bestikkelse, korruption, snyd og doping fra alle regeringsformer og alle verdenshjørner: USA-Sovjetunionens basketballmænd i 1972, den østtyske svømmer Rica Reinisch , den canadiske sprinter Ben Johnson, den sydkoreanske bokser Park Si Hun, den amerikanske atletikstjerne Marion Jones, den kinesiske træner Ma Junrens Familiehær af distanceløbere. Det er næsten sikkert, at nogle af de atleter, der klatrer op på podiet i Beijing for at få en jade-støttet guldmedalje om halsen, vil give disse medaljer tilbage, efter at narkotikahåndhævelse har indhentet dem.

På trods af alt dette vil mennesker rundt om i verden forsøge at sluge deres forbehold og omfavne legene. Beijing, med sine egne mangler, omfavner dem med særlig entusiasme. Igen og igen beskriver det olympiske organisationsudvalg og statspressen værten for legene som opfyldelsen af ​​et århundredgammel ambition. Dette refererer ikke til nogen nationale mål, der blev udtrykt af det smuldrende Qing -dynasti i 1908, men om en tilsyneladende uklar artikel, der blev offentliggjort i Tianjin det år - som det ser ud til, gennem en heroisk smule anvendt forskning. Den virkelige rekorddato er 1949, da Mao proklamerede Folkerepublikken, og da Kina og den vestlige verden vendte ryggen til hinanden.

Fanget mellem international afvisning og hjemlig uro sendte det kommunistiske Kina ikke et hold til sommer-OL i 32 år, et selvpålagt eksil, der endelig sluttede i 1984. I den kolde krig vest var der noget komisk over Kinas begrænsede atletiske præstation gennem årtierne: her var hundredvis af millioner af mennesker, og alt de var gode til var ping-pong. At de var vildt gode til det, gjorde det kun sjovere. Men den underliggende årsag var stort set geopolitisk: I løbet af 1950'erne bød det internationale bordtennisforbund-ledet af en britisk kommunist-Kina velkommen, selvom landets forhold til resten af ​​sportsverdenen gik i stykker.

Den kinesiske entusiasme for bordtennis er altså mindre et tegn på insularitet end på en praktisk og katolsk tilgang til atletik. Dette er grundlaget for Kinas plan om at vinde guldmedaljeantallet i år-at opsøge forsømte sportsgrene som kanosejlads og hælde ressourcer i dem. Sejr er sejr, og landet er i stand til at udarbejde nye atletiske prioriteter som det går. Men dette afspejler også en passende olympisk fordomsfrihed, den lokale version af den internationalt inkluderende ånd, der har bragt BMX i folden med decathlon og længdespring. At se kinesiske tv-sportskanaler er for en amerikansk seer ligesom at se den gamle “Wide World of Sports” udvidet til uendelig: svømning, volleyball til kvinder, europæisk fodbold, Formel 1-løb, basketball i mindre ligaer, tyrefægtning-døgnet rundt og alt år. Da Beijing var vært for en verdenssnookerturnering i 2006, var der snookerkampe fra de britiske øer på tv i uger efter.

Alligevel ser verden ikke rigtigt på, om Kina kan nå de højeste internationale niveauer af fældeskydning eller épée. Den 8. august skal markere Beijings transformation fra en grum, støvet, totalitær hovedstad til en glitrende international destination. De maksimalistiske forberedelser-det mest avantgarde stadion nogensinde! Det største frivilligkorps! De mest talrige tegneseriemaskotter! - er en del af en endnu større makeover af hele byen, som et symbol på en nation, der er omdannet til et centrum for velstand og indflydelse i det nye århundrede. Det samlede areal af byggepladser i Beijing er halvanden gange større end Manhattan. Olympiske besøgende finder nyåbnede metrolinjer, nye butiksvinduer overalt, en ny skyline i centrum med den lodrette sløjfe af Rem Koolhaas kinesiske centrale fjernsynsbygning mod 74-etagers skaft af Kinas World Trade Center Tower 3, i en kolossal Freudian standoff på tværs af den tredje Ringvej. Der vil være 30 millioner urtepotter. Der vil være gratis trådløs i store dele af byen, i hvert fald indtil legene er slut.

Udefra er der en tendens til at se hele opbygningen som Potemkinisme, et skuespil sat på for at narre de besøgende. I nogle henseender kan det være sådan - prøv at bruge det gratis trådløse netværk til at nå Blogspot, Tibet.org eller endda BBC -webstedet og se, hvad der sker - men både mennesker i Beijing, kinesere og udlændinge kommer med en anden analogi: de olympiske forberedelser er som at rydde op i dit hus i en fart, før virksomheden kommer over. Rodet bliver proppet ind i skabe eller under sengen tørrer du badeværelset af, gæsterne vil bruge dig til at skjule de snavsede tallerkener og grave matchende gafler og stofservietter ud. Det er ikke sådan du lever hver dag.

Bedrager du dine gæster? Eller viser du dem, hvordan du ville leve, hvis tingene var anderledes?


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Vi vurderer, at infrastrukturudgifterne vil øge det langsigtede BNP med 0,3 procent, men denne positive økonomiske effekt opvejes helt af stigningen i selskabsbeskatningen, hvilket resulterer i mindre virksomhedsinvesteringer, som reducerer BNP med 0,5 procent på sigt, reducerer lønningerne med 0,5 procent og eliminerer 101.000 fuldtidsækvivalente job, foreslår Tax Foundation ’s analyse af The American Jobs Plan.


Empiriske tendenser i CPC's eksterne engagement

I modsætning til de fleste andre afdelinger i centralkomiteen har ID-CPC en velholdt hjemmeside, hvor den udførligt rapporterer om sine internationale aktiviteter på højt niveau fra 2002 og fremefter. 4 CPC's dokumentation afslører normalt hvem CPC interagerer med, hvor og hvornår. I nogle tilfælde giver ID-CPC også korte beskrivelser af de diskuterede emner. Det rapporterer generelt om møder, der involverer embedsmænd på højt niveau, f.eks. Ministeren eller viceministrene i ID-CPC, cheferne og stedfortrædende chefer for andre afdelinger i centraludvalget eller embedsmænd på højtstående provinspartier. I alt har vi downloadet 5.080 (engelsksprogede) nyhedsartikler, der indeholder meddelelser og beskrivelser af fest-til-fest-besøg eller engagementer med andre udenlandske repræsentanter samt skriftlige udtryk for empati såsom lykønskninger eller kondoleanser. CPC's omhyggelige rapportering om sine aktiviteter stemmer overens med strategiske ændringer i Kinas udenrigspolitik. ID-CPC udviklede sit websted i begyndelsen af ​​2000'erne, da den kinesiske regering lancerede sit offentlige diplomatiprogram og opfordrede forskellige aktører til at rapportere om deres aktiviteter (Zhao 2015, 189). Offentlig rapportering af, hvem der mødes med CPC, har til formål at kreditere legitimitet til CPC's regel og vise indenlandske og internationale målgrupper, at CPC har mange venner.

Inden yderligere analyse er nogle overvejelser om dataene i orden. Som et produkt af selve ID-CPC'en indeholder dataene, hvad ID-CPC vil have os til at læse. For bedre at forstå potentielle skævheder i rapporteringen triangulerede vi dataene med andre kilder. Vi interviewede 16 deltagere i part-to-party-udvekslinger fra Afrika, Europa og Kina for at identificere potentiel underrapportering. 5 Vi triangulerede også oplysninger fra nyhedsartikler med lokale aviser i de lande i Afrika og Asien, hvor vi ville være mest mistænksomme over for underrapportering. Vi fokuserede især på lande, hvor forbindelserne er kontroversielle, og derfor kan underrapportering forventes, f.eks. I lande, der har anspændte forbindelser med Kina eller opretholder forbindelser med Taiwan. Så vidt vi kan bedømme ud fra interviewene og den lokale presseanalyse, synes besøgsmønstrene, som dokumenteret på webstedet, at være en pålidelig proxy, der angiver hyppigheden af ​​kontakt på højt niveau mellem CPC og dets udenlandske partnere.

Vi tæller i alt 3.658 delegationskontakter med direkte interaktion mellem ID-CPC og udenlandske repræsentanter mellem 2002 og 2017. Heraf finder 2.610 kontakter sted mellem ID-CPC og udenlandske parter. I yderligere 1.048 sager er interaktionspartnerne repræsentanter for staten eller statsinstitutionerne uden rapporteret tilknytning til en part (f.eks. Konger eller diplomater), forskningsinstitutioner eller forretningsaktører. Vi tæller hver part-til-part-interaktion kun én gang, selvom en og samme partsdelegations besøg er beskrevet i flere nyheder. Når en nyhed beskriver flere møder med partnere fra forskellige parter under en enkelt ID-CPC-delegations besøg i et fremmed land, anser vi hver part for at have en interaktion med ID-CPC.

Antallet af CPC-kontakter med parti- og ikke-partirepræsentanter steg betydeligt mellem 2002 og 2017 (figur 1). Især efter præsident Xis overtagelse i 2012 er der en kraftig stigning i ID-CPC's aktiviteter. CPC engagerer sig for det meste med andre partifunktionærer. Ikke-partikontakter er meget mindre hyppige. I overensstemmelse med CPC's egen dokumentation identificerer vi kontakt med 462 forskellige politiske partier i 161 lande mellem 2002 og 2017. 6 ID-CPC modtager generelt besøgende i Beijing mere, end det rejser til udlandet for møder (figur 2). Dette er ikke overraskende, da ID-CPC skal investere flere ressourcer til at rejse til udlandet, end det gør for at modtage udenlandske gæster i Kina.

Antal kontakter for ID-CPC med parti- og ikke-partirepræsentanter.


CCP udnytter sin købekraft til stor fordel

Efter 10 års praksis havde det kinesiske kommunistparti mestret kunsten at indkøbe ordrediplomati. Dygtigheden afspejles i kontrollen med timingen. Kina har været ganske effektivt til at øge indkøbsordrens diplomatiske indflydelse ved at forlænge købsaktivitetsperioden eller forlænge kontraktprocessen. I de tidligere dage var indkøbsorderdiplomatiet normalt en engangsaftale, der varede mindre end en måned. I senere år udviklede KKP imidlertid en mere effektiv strategi ved at gøre købsprocessen til en længere forhandling og sende delegationer i partier for at placere indkøbsordrer. Disse ordrer blev placeret strategisk før og efter deres nøgleaderbesøg. Nogle gange varer aktiviteterne mere end seks måneder.

F.eks. Blev der mellem november 2003 og januar 2004 sendt fire indkøbsdelegationer til USA. Ordrer omfattede fly, biler, sojabønner og telekommunikationsudstyr. Den samlede periode strakte sig over to måneder. Den 18. november 2003 offentliggjorde den amerikanske regering pludselig, at den ville sætte kvotebegrænsninger på import af kinesiske tekstiler, badekåber og korsetter. Da meddelelsen fandt sted lige under de igangværende indkøbsaktiviteter fra Kina, reagerede Beijing rettidigt ved at suspendere en delegation, der skulle købe sojabønner fra USA. Suspensionen lagde et stort pres på de amerikanske landbrugsmarkeder. En række medlemmer af kongressen fra store stater, der producerer soja og hvede, herunder senats demokratiske leder Tom Daschle, pressede Bush -administrationen og til sidst indførte indrømmelser fra den amerikanske regering. Kina restaurerede indkøbsdelegationen af ​​sojabønner uger efter.

De kinesiske kommunistiske diplomatiske færdigheder i handelsforhandlinger nåede et nyt niveau med forlængelsen af ​​kontraktperioden. Beijing ville undgå at begå en stor aftale, men i stedet starte med rammeaftalen eller en hensigtsaftale og til sidst tegne kontrakten under besøg på højt plan. Flyindkøbsordrer blev normalt udført på denne måde. Fra den oprindelige hensigt med at købe til den endelige underskrivelse af kontrakten var der tre eller fire runder af den officielle bekræftelsesproces, der varede to til tre år. Hver konfirmationsproces ville skabe et behov for god diplomatisk og politisk atmosfære fra begge sider og dermed effektivt forlænge den periode, hvor CCP kontrollerer det bilaterale forhold. Denne måde at forhandle på viste en modning af kinesiske kommunistiske færdigheder i at få de resultater, de ønskede.

Selvfølgelig vil enhver stor køber have en stor indflydelse på handelsforhandlinger. Det er også karakteren af ​​at være en stor indkøber i et kapitalistisk system.


I Kina lukker de kirker, fængsler præster - og endda omskriver skriften

I slutningen af ​​oktober spurgte præsten i en af ​​Kinas mest kendte underjordiske kirker dette til sin menighed: havde de med succes spredt evangeliet i hele deres by? “Hvis i morgen formiddag Early Rain Covenant Church pludselig forsvandt fra byen Chengdu, hvis vi hver især forsvandt ud i det fri, ville denne by være anderledes? Vil nogen savne os? ” sagde Wang Yi, lænede sig over sin prædikestol og standsede for at lade spørgsmålet veje sit publikum. "Jeg ved ikke."

Næsten tre måneder senere bliver Wangs hypotetiske scenario sat på prøve. Kirken i det sydvestlige Kina er blevet lukket, og Wang og hans kone, Jiang Rong, forbliver tilbageholdt, efter at politiet arresterede mere end 100 Early Rain-kirkemedlemmer i december. Mange af dem, der ikke er blevet tilbageholdt, gemmer sig. Andre er blevet sendt væk fra Chengdu og afskåret fra at vende tilbage. Nogle, herunder Wangs mor og hans unge søn, er under nøje overvågning. Wang og hans kone sigtes for at have "tilskyndet til undergravning", en forbrydelse, der medfører en straf på op til 15 års fængsel.

Now the hall Wang preached from sits empty, the pulpit and cross that once hung behind him both gone. Prayer cushions have been replaced by a ping-pong table and a film of dust. New tenants, a construction company and a business association, occupy the three floors the church once rented. Plainclothes police stand outside, turning away those looking for the church.

One of the officers told the Observatør: “I have to tell you to leave and watch until you get in a car and go.”

Wang Yi, pastor of the Early Rain church, who was arrested and detained three months ago, along with his wife. Photograph: Early Rain/Facebook

Early Rain is the latest victim of what Chinese Christians and rights activists say is the worst crackdown on religion since the country’s Cultural Revolution, when Mao Zedong’s government vowed to eradicate religion.

Researchers say the current drive, fuelled by government unease over the growing number of Christians and their potential links to the west, is aimed not so much at destroying Christianity but bringing it to heel.

“The government has orchestrated a campaign to ‘sinicise’ Christianity, to turn Christianity into a fully domesticated religion that would do the bidding of the party,” said Lian Xi, a professor at Duke University in North Carolina, who focuses on Christianity in modern China.

Over the past year, local governments have shut hundreds of unofficial congregations or “house churches” that operate outside the government-approved church network, including Early Rain. A statement signed by 500 house church leaders in November says authorities have removed crosses from buildings, forced churches to hang the Chinese flag and sing patriotic songs, and barred minors from attending.

Churchgoers say the situation will get worse as the campaign reaches more of the country. Another church in Chengdu was placed under investigation last week. Less than a week after the mass arrest of Early Rain members, police raided a children’s Sunday school at a church in Guangzhou. Officials have also banned the 1,500-member Zion church in Beijing after its pastor refused to install CCTV.

In November the Guangzhou Bible Reformed Church was shut for the second time in three months. “The Chinese Communist party (CCP) wants to be the God of China and the Chinese people. But according to the Bible only God is God. The government is scared of the churches,” said Huang Xiaoning, the church’s pastor.

Local governments have also shut the state-approved “sanzi” churches. Sunday schools and youth ministries have been banned. One of the first signs of a crackdown was when authorities forcibly removed more than 1,000 crosses from sanzi churches in Zhejiang province between 2014 and 2016.

“The goal of the crackdown is not to eradicate religions,” said Ying Fuk Tsang, director of the Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “President Xi Jinping is trying to establish a new order on religion, suppressing its blistering development. [The government] aims to regulate the ‘religious market’ as a whole.”

While the CCP is officially atheist, Protestantism and Catholicism are two of five faiths sanctioned by the government and religious freedom has been enshrined in the constitution since the 1980s. For decades, authorities tolerated the house churches, which refused to register with government bodies that required church leaders to adapt teachings to follow party doctrine.

Members of the Early Rain Covenant Church pray during a meeting in their church before it was shut down in December 2018.

As China experienced an explosion in the number of religious believers, the government has grown wary of Christianity and Islam in particular, with their overseas links. In Xinjiang, a surveillance and internment system has been built for Muslim minorities, notably the Uighurs.

Xi has called for the country to guard against “infiltration” through religion and extremist ideology.

“What happens in Xinjiang and what happens to house churches is connected,” said Eva Pils, a professor of law at King’s College London, focusing on human rights. “Those kinds of new attitudes have translated into different types of measures against Christians, which amount to intensified persecution of religious groups.”

There are at least 60 million Christians in China, spanning rural and urban areas. Congregation-based churches can organise large groups across the country and some have links with Christian groups abroad.

Pastors such as Wang of Early Rain are especially alarming for authorities. Under Wang, a legal scholar and public intellectual, the church has advocated for parents of children killed in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake – deaths many critics say were caused by poor government-run construction – or for families of those affected by faulty vaccines. Every year the church commemorates victims of the 4 June protests in 1989, which were forcibly put down by the Chinese military.

“Early Rain church is one of the few who dare to face what is wrong in society,” said one member. “Most churches don’t dare talk about this, but we obey strictly obey the Bible, and we don’t avoid anything.”

Wang and Early Rain belong to what some see as a new generation of Christians that has emerged alongside a growing civil rights movement. Increasingly, activist church leaders have taken inspiration from the democratising role the church played in eastern European countries in the Soviet bloc or South Korea under martial law, according to Lian. Several of China’s most active human rights lawyers are Christians.

“They have come to see the political potential of Christianity as a force for change,” said Lian. “What really makes the government nervous is Christianity’s claim to universal rights and values.”

Catholics wait to take communion during the Palm Sunday mass at a ‘house church’ near Shijiazhuang. Photograph: Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

As of 2018, the government has implemented sweeping rules on religious practices, adding more requirements for religious groups and barring unapproved organisations from engaging in any religious activity. But the campaign is not just about managing behaviour. One of the goals of a government work plan for “promoting Chinese Christianity” between 2018 and 2022 is “thought reform”. The plan calls for “retranslating and annotating” the Bible, to find commonalities with socialism and establish a “correct understanding” of the text.

“Ten years ago, we used to be able to say the party was not really interested in what people believed internally,” said Pils. “Xi Jinping’s response is much more invasive and it is in some ways returning to Mao-era attempts to control hearts and minds.”

Bibles, sales of which have always been controlled in China, are no longer available for purchase online, a loophole that had existed for years. In December, Christmas celebrations were banned in several schools and cities across China.

“Last year’s crackdown is the worst in three decades,” said Bob Fu, the founder of ChinaAid, a Christian advocacy group based in the US.

In Chengdu, Early Rain has not vanished. Before the raid, a plan was in place to preserve the church, with those who were not arrested expected to keep it running, holding meetings wherever they could. Slowly, more Early Rain members are being released. As of 9 January, 25 were still in detention.

They maintain contact through encrypted platforms. On New Year’s Eve, 300 people joined an online service, some from their homes, others from cars or workplaces, to pray for 2019. Others gather in small groups in restaurants and parks. One member, a student who was sent back to Guangzhou, said he preaches the gospel to the police who monitor him.

The church continues to send out daily scripture and posts videos of sermons. In one, pastor Wang alludes to the coming crackdown: “In this war, in Xinjiang, in Shanghai, in Beijing, in Chengdu, the rulers have chosen an enemy that can never be imprisoned – the soul of man. Therefore they are doomed to lose this war.”


Why was the US table tennis team sent to communist China even after a difference in ideology? - Historie

Historically, Americans have not been very effective in dealing with the radical mindset. Like Neville Chamberlain, who really believed the growing hostility with Hitler’s Germany was just a big misunderstanding, Americans have too often believed that if we could only sit down with the Osama bin Ladens of the world they would see that we are a sincere, reasonable people and violence is of no benefit to anyone.

Tucker Carlson wondered why airborne units aren’t used to quell the rioting. They were once.

Contained in the century-long slow leak of Christianity from Western culture are many things of value, not the least of which is the doctrine of evil. Now, a vaguely expressed secular notion that people are basically good and are motivated by similar desires and felt needs is the reigning paradigm.

But conflict with some people, some nations, and some groups is not a question of mutual understanding. It is a question of evil. It is a lesson Americans learned the hard way — but learn it they did — during the Korean War. And in this culturally defining moment, it is a lesson we would do well to recall.

After Operation Chromite in September of 1950 — MacArthur’s daring landing at Inchon and drive across the Korean Peninsula — hundreds of thousands of (North) Korea People’s Army (KPA) soldiers were encircled, captured, and destroyed. As a consequence, the UN prisoner of war population swiftly rose from less than a thousand in August to more than 130,000 by November.

Makeshift POW camps were hastily constructed to house more than 80,000 of that number on Koje-do (Geoje in many modern spellings), a county-sized island just off the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula. Prisoners were divided into four massive enclosures, with each containing eight compounds. U.S. soldiers of subpar quality and insufficient quantity were assigned to keep them there.

When ceasefire negotiations began at Kaesong in July 1951 — which were later moved to Panmunjom — resistance among prisoners became systemic, organized, and violent. Messages were cleverly passed between Gen. Nam Il, North Korea’s chief negotiator at the talks, all the way to Koje-do, where they were delivered through the wire to the communist leaders within the prison camps.

The general’s instructions were clear: create martyrs for the communist cause and thereby undermine America’s moral authority at the negotiating table. To this end, communist enforcers at Koje-do accused their jailers of brutality, cultural insensitivity, and gross mistreatment they staged riots in an effort to provoke an armed response and they prepared for a general prison breakout, to force the UN to transfer front line troops to the rear echelons.

Brigadier Gen. Francis Dodd, the commander of the Koje-do island installation, naively took prisoner complaints at face value. Hence, the communist strategy, part of an old radical playbook, met with startling success. Prisoner violence (usually against other prisoners) was largely overlooked while every accusation of mistreatment from their guards resulted in an investigation, dismissal, and a Drew Brees-like mea culpa. But the communist leaders would not be placated. Like the endgame to coronavirus quarantines, the goalposts were continually moved.

In his classic history of the Korean conflict, Denne slags krig, T. R. Fehrenbach writes,

[In World War II] it was not until 1943 Americans had any prisoners, and these were from a foe of the same basic culture, who sensed they were already beaten. (There had never been enough Japanese POWs to matter.) But in Korea the United States not only had taken thousands of POW’s of alien culture it faced an alien psychology also.

On May 7, 1952, Dodd, failing to understand the “alien psychology” of which Fehrenbach wrote, agreed to meet with KPA Senior Col. Lee Hak Ku at the gate of Compound 76. It was there that Dodd stood before a rioting prisoner mob like Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey. At a prearranged signal, the American general was seized and pulled deep inside the compound before guards could react. Any attempt to rescue him by force, Americans were told, would result in Gen. Dodd’s immediate execution.

What followed was, in the words of Gen. Mark Clark, “the biggest flap of the war.” In the stuff of a Hollywood epic drama, Dodd was placed on trial for crimes against humanity while ideologically unreliable prisoners were tried and summarily executed by the fanatical communists within the camp.

North Korea and China wasted no time in accusing the U.S. of violating the Geneva Convention. And in a mind-bending twist of facts, the likes of which have not been seen since the New York Times og Washington Post last went to print, their anti-American allies in the media quickly turned the Koje-do fiasco into a propaganda bonanza. Moscow’s Pravda screamed,

Koje Island! Again, we learn that “civilized” Americans can be yet more inhuman, yet more infamous than the bloody Hitlerites. Dachau was a death camp, Maidenek was a death factory Koje is a whole island of death. The American hangmen are torturing, tormenting, and killing unarmed people here. They are experimenting with their poisons on them.

At Panmunjom, Gen. Nam capitalized on his own success in engineering the revolt on Koje-do:

Day after day, facing his opposite numbers across the conference table, Nam II poured out crocodile tears for the fate of the communist prisoners whom he alleged were suffering fiendish torments inflicted by the “sadistic and inhuman” United Nations jailers. Under a smoke screen of pious platitudes, Nam Il coolly directed the apparatus of subversion, terrorism, and political murder which throttled anti-communist opposition among the POW’s and turned the compounds at Koje-do into armed camps of Red defiance.

An embarrassed President Truman ordered outgoing UN Commander Gen. Matthew Ridgway to bring Koje-do to heel. Ridgway simply passed the problem along to incoming UN Commander Gen. Mark Clark who, in turn, ordered Brigadier Gen. Haydon “Bull” Boatner to the island to quell the insurrection brewing there.

Upon inspection, Boatner quickly realized just how badly the situation had been handled by his predecessors. The compounds had become “autonomous zones” where no American dared go. In the fashion of Seattle’s own autonomous zone leader Raz Simone, Colonel Lee paraded about like a peacock, drilling his soldiers — now armed with knives, flails, spears, and stolen gasoline to make Molotov cocktails — and prepared them for what Boatner could only guess was an attempt to take over the whole island and slaughter its inhabitants.

Boatner, the 14th commander of the prison installation in two years, ordered an immediate evacuation of all civilians from the island. To do the job of breaking resistance at Koje-do, he then demanded that Clark give him a thousand paratroopers from the 187th Regimental Combat Team then in Japan. The so-called “Rakkasans” — literally “umbrella men,” a nickname given to them by the Japanese during the occupation of that country — were a battle-hardened regiment. As if that weren’t enough, the 187th had been recently supplemented by elements of the now-decimated and decommissioned elite Airborne Ranger units. Clark, over a barrel, reluctantly agreed.

My father, one of the aforementioned Rangers, recalled being on leave in Tokyo when he and others received notice that they had two hours to finish their drinks, kiss their girls goodbye, and return to base to prepare for immediate deployment to an unknown destination.

“We thought we were going back into combat. Instead, we deplaned on Koje. By that time, the whole world knew about the SNAFU there. We were briefed and told it would be our job to crush any opposition to breaking up the compounds and moving the prisoners to new ones. That suited us. No man on leave and ordered back into the field does so happily. To say that we arrived in a bad mood is putting it mildly.”

The sudden disappearance of the island’s civilians only to be rapidly replaced by this elite force was an ominous sign to the communist hardliners that there was a new sheriff in town. Then, writes Fehrenbach:

Boatner had the paratroops stage a mock advance into an empty compound next to 76, with fixed bayonets and flamethrowers, while the communist prisoners watched. The demonstration went like clockwork it had been timed and scheduled to the second, and every officer briefed on his part. The demonstration was both impressive and frightening.

According to Gen. Clark, “Staff planning for this operation was done as carefully as for any orthodox military campaign.” Boatner then set up loudspeakers and, in English, Korean, and Chinese, he informed prisoners that if they failed to lay down their arms and divide themselves into groups of 500 for relocation, the boys at his back would be sent in, and they would not shrink from violence. The choice was theirs. Instead of complying with his directive, prisoners barricaded the main gate, dug trenches, and killed any who broke ranks.

The following day, June 10, 1952, at 5:45 a.m., Boatner gave one more warning over the loudspeakers. Det var spild af tid. The prisoners, like rioters of recent vintage, shouted defiance and hurled objects — and thus they sealed their own fate.

Boatner decided to start with Compound 76, where most of the communist hardliners were concentrated. Beat them down in full view of the other compounds, he reasoned, and the rest will meekly surrender. It was a savvy move.

“Paratroops are a sharp but fragile tool,” says Fehrenbach, “which, since they cannot be used and then put back into the bottle, are best reserved for special missions … these men wanted to fight. Any fight, anywhere, would do.”

With a full complement of UN observers and members of the international press watching from a nearby hillside — you, too, can watch it all here — Boatner sent in the 187th. Instead of attempting to breach the front gate, they cut the wire at the rear of Compound 76 and entered with fixed bayonets and no cartridges in the chambers. No man was to shoot without a direct order from an officer:

The paratroops advanced, slowly, grimly, pushing them back. Now there was chaos. The POW’s had set their huts afire, and smoke blanketed the area, choking men, obscuring vision. In the Korean press, a number of men panicked, and tried to run. They were killed by their own people, with spears in the back. Then the tough paratroopers met the lines of Koreans, and in a wild melee broke the back of their resistance.

After an hour-and-a-half of fighting and without firing a shot, Boatner was master of Compound 76. Like Saddam Hussein a half a century later, Col. Lee Hak Ku was found cowering in a hole. Literally dragged from it by the seat of his pants, the colonel faced a grim fate — but not from the Americans. Repatriated to North Korea, he was tried and shot in a manner that likely mirrored the kangaroo courts of 76. As for the other compounds, having witnessed firsthand the display of power, their resistance wilted, and order was restored to the island.

Speaking of the incident at Koje-do after the war, General Clark observed that “[It] is in itself both a case study in the technique of communist intrigue and a dire warning of the efficiency and imagination of the communist conspiracy against us.”

All of this should sound eerily familiar to Americans watching the recent riots sweeping the country from Seattle to New York. Yes, I recognize the difference between peaceful protesters and rioters. And I likewise recognize that many well-intentioned people are swept up in both. They are what economist Ludwig von Mises called “useful innocents.” But no one who has studied or observed the tactics of communist, fascist, anarchist, or radical Islamic agitators can fail to recognize that at the core of the Black Lives Matter (and Antifa) movement lies a violent ideology masquerading as a champion of the very things it seeks to undermine: justice and equality.

Before rioting, looting, and lawlessness become, to use a phrase the Left would give us for an altogether different reason, the “new normal,” Americans would do well to look to the past and learn the lessons of Koje-do and the broader lessons that the Cold War taught us about dealing with radical secular ideologies — and make no mistake about it, that is precisely what we are now facing.

As the useful innocents — or idiots, as the case may be — in government, industry, the academy, and even churches rush headlong to apologize for wrongs real and imagined and declare their allegiance to Black Lives Matter, I cannot help but think that these Americans are singing a song of German origin they do not understand, and behind it all is Marx, the master lyricist.


Are the U.S. and China in a Cold War?

To be fair, the U.S.-China relationship had already begun to deteriorate under the Obama Administration when Beijing, starting in 2013, moved to militarize the South China Sea. It did this by creating a total of seven new islands, which it used to house military facilities, and became increasingly confrontational in its relationship with its neighbors.

As a candidate for the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump had repeatedly claimed that the terms of U.S. -China trade were unfair to the U.S. that they had resulted in the loss of millions of high paying manufacturing jobs that both the Chinese government, its state-owned enterprises and private Chinese companies were routinely stealing American technology and that China had taken advantage of the U.S.

Nonetheless, the Trump Administration, notwithstanding that many of its trade officials were notoriously "China hawks," did show a willingness to continue the Sino-American economic relationship, albeit on radically reset terms.

The term "Cold War" was coined in 1947 by Bernard Baruch, a prominent financier and longtime advisor to the U.S. government, to describe the state of U.S. -Soviet relations and the challenges they posed to the U.S. The term resonated with American media and was quickly adopted to describe what historians called, "a war without fighting or bloodshed, but a battle nonetheless."

The Cold War between Washington and Moscow lasted approximately 40 years. It was fought mostly by proxies and in the shadows of covert intelligence operations. To call it bloodless is a misnomer. Bullets fired by proxies were just as lethal as those fired by the military forces that sponsored them a lesson driven home to both American and Soviet soldiers in conflicts ranging from Afghanistan to Vietnam.

It's hard to see how the experience of the Soviet-American Cold War is analogous to the current state of Sino-American relations. The U.S. is not engaged in any military conflicts where its opponents are Chinese proxies.

There have been military clashes between the military forces of China and those of its neighbors. Some, like the Philippines, are bound to the U.S. by defense treaties. Others, like Vietnam or India, have no such agreements, much less any explicit U.S. guarantees of their security, but share a common interest with Washington in preventing Chinese encroachment on their sovereignty. While those incidents had casualties, although none were American, they fall far short of the proxy conflicts that characterized the Soviet-American Cold War.

The U.S. and China are involved in a wide-ranging economic competition, one that spills over into American bilateral relations with other countries, and also impacts the "rules" of an international system that has evolved, largely under American leadership, in the postwar period. The U.S. competes economically with other countries, most notably Japan and the European Union, but this rivalry is different from the Sino-American one.

First, while countries like Japan or the members of the EU compete economically with the U.S., and while they may seek to shape the "rules" of world trade and the international economic system to their advantage, they stop short of seeking a wholesale replacement of the U.S. dollar-centric global financial system. Even the creation of the euro as the common currency of the EU, while it had the added advantage of being an alternative reserve currency to the U.S. dollar, was never envisioned to be a replacement for it.

Secondly, except for China, the other major countries with which the U.S. competes economically are ones that are aligned with the U.S. militarily and, with some exceptions, diplomatically. While economic growth and technological innovation may enhance a U.S. ally's military capabilities, such enhancements do not have bearing on U.S. national security. Indeed, in most cases, they enhance it by expanding alliance wide capabilities or diminishing the U.S. contribution to the common defense.

China is the exception to this rule. The growth of the Chinese economy and its technological sophistication directly impact Beijing's military capabilities while, at the same time, enhancing its diplomatic power. Chinese military and foreign policy has become increasingly, nationalistic, aggressive and combative, a style the Chinese media calls "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy." That means China's economic growth has a direct bearing on America's defense and diplomatic posture in East Asia, specifically and generally in the Indo-Pacific basin.

Not only does that posture increase American defense requirements in the region, it also raises the probability that aggressive Chinese actions, especially ones aimed at countries with which the U.S. has a defense agreement, will lead to a confrontation or even a military clash with the U.S. Currently, Beijing has territorial disputes with every one of its 14 neighbors. In some of these disputes, it is unilaterally changing the "facts on the ground."


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“[An] accomplished study of China and sport. Hvor Olympic Dreams scores highest is in describing and explaining the importance of the Olympic Games to China's self-esteem and its sense of belonging on the international stage, and how successive leaders have focused on the powerful political platform the event provides.”Clifford Coonan, South China Morning Post

“In this history of sports in China over the past century, Xu accents the cultural intertwining of athletics and politics as the country continually increases its emphasis on the former to enhance its stature in the world.”John Maxymuk, Library Journal

“Thoroughly researched and lucidly articulated, Mr. Xu‘s book provides a unique perspective on China through the history of sports. Just as baseball and football define the heart and mind of America, China’s promotion of various sports as national games also speaks to the cultural psyche of a country seeking recognition in the global political arena.”Yunte Huang, Santa Barbara News-Press

“Probably no Olympic Games has been so deeply tied to a political project as Beijing's. The links between politics in China and the games are well told in Olympic Dreams by the historian, Xu Guoqi, who describes how for more than a century the Olympics has been wrapped up in Chinese ideas about national revival and international prestige.”Geoff Dyer, Financial Times

“Xu Guoqi's masterful survey of China's hundred-year tryst with the Olympics, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008, reminds the reader that sports have been central to the construction of the Chinese nation and its links with the rest of the world. Xu shows how politicians have micromanaged every aspect of China's sporting progress.”Mark Leonard, Chronicle of Higher Education

“What distinguishes this. from so many of the recent flood of books on China, is its emphasis on the political and national role of sport in the Chinese ascendancy. The Olympics are emblematic of the "new" China but, interestingly, [Xu] speculates on whether the long-held dream of the Communist party to host the Olympics may well spell the beginning of its end.”Steven Carroll, Alderen

“This highly readable book traces the history of China's sporting ambition, from an obscure lecture in Tientsin in 1908 to the "high-quality Olympics with Chinese characteristics". It is a useful introduction to an awkward topic that simply won't go away.”Michael Rank, Værgen

“A thoughtful and highly informative book that all interested in the Beijing Olympics will find rewarding, and it should be required reading for journalists covering the 2008 Games.”Steve Tsang, Times Higher Education Supplement

“The entire history of [China's] involvement with the Olympics, and international sport in general, has been overtly political, as Xu Guoqi ably demonstrates in Olympic Dreams.”Tod Hoffman, Montreal Gazette

“Thoroughly researched and painstakingly footnoted.”Garth Woolsey, Toronto Star

“The 2008 Beijing games, like other sporting events in the past, will be a window into Chinese national pride and global ambitions. Selv om Olympic Dreams was written before the March Tibet riots and the subsequent outbursts of Chinese nationalism, Mr. Xu’s general argument still stands, and is even somewhat prescient. Mr. Xu has a clear and readable writing style, and his analysis is punctuated with lively examples. Beijing’s politicization of sports clearly has some uniquely Chinese characteristics. But that is not necessarily the main lesson of this book. Examples of similar phenomena―from Hungary to Argentina―remind that sports and politics are often two sides of the same coin. The grander the event, the more political the stakes.”Emily Parker, Østlig økonomisk gennemgang

Om forfatteren

From The Washington Post

The Chinese government has said over and over in the last few months that the Beijing Olympics should not be politicized. The uproar over Tibet has no place in the Games, officials insist. Nor do humanitarian concerns over Sudan's Darfur region belong in the Olympic spotlight. As for human rights in China itself, well, that's an internal matter.

Yet, politics have long been at the heart of China's relations with the modern Olympic movement, as Xu Guoqi, an associate professor at Kalamazoo College, shows in his illuminating history, Olympic Dreams. The first time China participated in the Games, in 1932 at Los Angeles, the goal was to prevent Japan from scoring a propaganda coup. Japanese occupation authorities had planned to dispatch a stocky Chinese sprinter named Liu Changchun to represent the Manchukuo republic, the puppet state Japan had set up in Manchuria and Mongolia. To foil that plan, China's Nationalist government hurriedly scraped together some money and sent Liu as a one-man Chinese delegation. He fared poorly as a sprinter but held high the Chinese flag.

Later on, Mao Zedong saw sports victories as a way to prove the superiority of the socialist way. On advice from the U.S.S.R., China cultivated national teams. But during the first two decades of Communist rule, China kept its athletes out of the Olympics to protest Taiwan's participation. (More recently, both China and Taiwan have sent teams under artful compromises over the island's name.)

When Mao decided the time had come to make friends in the West, he also found sports a handy tool for that purpose. Mao and President Nixon had been exchanging secret messages through intermediaries for months before the Chinese sent a team to the World Table Tennis Championship in Japan in April 1971. As Xu relates, Zhou En-lai, who was in charge of foreign relations, issued detailed instructions to the Chinese players on what to do if they met Americans. "The Chinese were not permitted to exchange team flags," for example, but they "could shake hands," Xu notes. When American player Glenn Cowan jumped on a Chinese bus to greet Chinese star Zhuang Zedong, Zhuang was ready with a silk painting to present as a gift. Mao then gave the order for the Chinese players to invite the U.S. team to China by the end of the month, the Americans had alighted in Beijing. "The small ping-pong ball, worth only about 25 cents, played a unique and significant role . . . in transforming Sino-U.S. relations," Xu concludes.

Even before Mao, sports had played an eminently political role in China. Chinese nationalists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw athletics as a way to create vigorous men who could wage war and change the country's reputation as the "sick man of east Asia." As part of the national revival they hoped to foster, they embraced Western sports to counter the Mandarin paradigm of Chinese men as spindly, sedentary and effete.

Despite the reformers' efforts, to some degree the old paradigm has remained alive. Traditionally, most Chinese have been brought up to think they should be clever, disciplined and able to bear hardship, but not powerful or swift. Because Yao Ming's jousts with fellow NBA giants and Liu Xiang's triumph in the 110-meter hurdles at the 2004 Athens Olympics shattered racial stereotypes, they were hailed as breakthroughs by a new generation of Chinese. The 2008 Beijing Olympics, where China hopes to win more medals than any other nation, also was intended to have a political message.

Since abandoning doctrinaire socialism three decades ago, China has enjoyed an economic explosion that has given its 1.3 billion people a standard of living their parents could hardly imagine, and the government has entered into normal relations with most countries, becoming a diplomatic as well as an economic player in Asia and beyond. By hosting the Games, China was going to celebrate this status. Perhaps more important, it was going to receive international recognition of its achievements and, in some measure, acceptance of the Communist Party's glacial pace toward political change.

Xu's misfortune, and China's, is that this landscape, which he ably paints in his final chapter, shifted not long after the manuscript was sent to the printer. Riots in Tibet and protests along the Olympic Torch relay route created a global audience for questions about China's worthiness to host the Olympics. The atmosphere has soured badly, and no one knows whether it can be repaired before the Games begin in August.

The May 12 earthquake in Sichuan also will affect the Olympics. A country in mourning, China is likely to attract sympathy. But sorrow may change the tone of the event. Xu's history of China's participation in the Olympics remains enlightening, but the unsettled 2008 Games have become the stuff of journalism, changing every day.


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Kommentarer:

  1. Cristoforo

    I agree, this is a great message.

  2. Adalbert

    YES SUPER !!!!!!!!!!!!

  3. Cearbhall

    De tager fejl. Skriv til mig i PM, det taler til dig.

  4. Ascot

    Den absurde situation kom ud

  5. Westbroc

    Fedt nok

  6. Gawen

    Jeg lykønsker, en genial idé, og det er behørigt

  7. Jutilar

    Du tager fejl. Jeg er i stand til at bevise det. Skriv til mig i PM, det taler til dig.



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